

THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF CATALONIA

By
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IN MEMORIAM JOSEP MARIA BATISTA I ROCA (1895-1978)

Dr. J. M. Batista i Roca, founder member of the Anglo-Catalan Society and its first Honorary Life President, always hoped that the Society would at some stage be able to publish some of the work of its members and guest speakers. Unfortunately this was never possible during his lifetime, but now that the Society, with the help of a grant from Omnium Cultural, is undertaking the publication of Occasional Papers it seems appropriate that this Series as a whole should be dedicated to the fond memory which the Society holds of him.

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FOREWORD

A la memòria de Josep Maria Soriola i Bosch, català com cal

The following essay is based on a lecture given at a meeting of the Anglo-Catalan Society in November 1979* Members of the Society's Committee kindly suggested that I write up the ideas presented at that meeting so that they could be published under its auspices in a series of Occasional Papers then being planned. As I was then, and still am now, engaged in some work related to the subject and had been writing around it earlier, I was only too glad to accept the invitation. However, and precisely because this is a short, half speculative and half analytical statement on the nature of Catalan society, I would like to say quite clearly that the reader will not be confronted with a scholarly paper, in which every paragraph is substantiated with footnotes and references to data. I have preferred to keep to the more lively style of the essay, sometimes even retaining some echoes of the original spoken lecture.

At a less superficial level the present essay on the social structure of Catalonia offers some personal reflections on certain facets of my native land and my own tribe. This is usually a drawback for anyone trying to be objective. However there are more disadvantages: there are already some good, even important, critical accounts of Catalonia. Two stand out: Josep Ferrater's *Les formes de la vida catalana* (1944) and Vicens Vives' *Notícia de Catalunya* (1956). In a paradoxically indirect way, Fuster's *Nosaltres els valencians* (1962) ought to be added to them. I can neither possibly dream of achieving their quality nor remain uninfluenced by them. In so many ways, my own essay is a dialogue with these classics, both when I agree with their authors and when I am bound to see things differently.

*The Society's XXV Annual Conference was held in the Spanish Institute, London. The Author and Editors wish to place on record their gratitude to the *Institute* de Espana* for a grant towards the cost of the present publication. Such participation in the background to and the launching of this series is felt to be particularly propitious.

Readers sharing my own sociological preoccupations will soon be aware that this essay, though brief, is not unrelated to certain theoretical trends and perspectives in the analysis of the evolution of societies. Yet, I have refrained from entering into any lengthy digressions on the issues involved, that, I am sure many readers would find unnecessary or irrelevant. Therefore these issues either appear between the lines or are pushed well into the background. Some could be mentioned here, however. The Marxist view of the political economy and the dynamics of capitalism has been used to understand certain important aspects of class formation and conflict in Catalonia, including the pattern of either accommodation or confrontation of the Catalan social classes with the wider social structure of Spain and its state. The relationship between primordial community feelings and nationalism, on the one hand, and social inequality and political subordination, on the other, are looked at in die light of hypotheses once put forward by Ferdinand Tönnies and much revised by later thinkers. My treatment of the issues involved also owes much to the 'work ethic' debate first brought to fruition by Weber's analysis of the relationship between capitalism and the Protestant ethic: it seems to me that Catalonia, that non-Calvinist yet quintessentially capitalist and bourgeois country, may be a good test case of the Weberian thesis, given its Mediterranean position and Catholic cultural traditions. In this respect, Gramsci's ideas about popular culture and the people's 'common sense' as they appear embodied in the 'civil society', underpinning a successful system of domination or 'hegemony', have proved very useful to me. Other theoretical matters are also touched upon here - on the state and political domination, the rise of 'corporatism', the appearance of 'mass society' trends, and others - some of which I have approached or developed elsewhere.

My views on Catalan society have benefitted considerably from discussion with colleagues and students at the Catalan Summer University of Prada de Conflent, in Northern Catalonia, which I have been attending quite regularly since it began, in 1969. They also owe much to long conversations with Jordi Estivill, of the University of Perpignan, and with Angus Mackay of Edinburgh University. My thanks go to them here. I must also thank the members of the Committee of the Anglo-Catalan Society for their encouragement, the Society's Honorary Life-President, Sr. Joan Gili, and its Secretary, Dr. Alan Yates, for their continuous and very active help in the publication of this text.

What follows centres around the society of the Principality of Catalonia, with only minor references to that part of it which is under French administration, and excluding the other Catalan-speaking areas, i.e. Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Andorra and that Catalan enclave in Sardinia, the city of l'Alguer. They are only ignored for clarity's sake, given the strict limitations of space.

For those readers who only possess a limited knowledge of Catalonia but would like to know more about it I have included, at the end, a necessarily brief and highly selective bibliography, both in English and in other languages, together with two basic maps.

Salvador Giner

London, Winter, 1979/80

The need for a new edition of this essay on Catalan society has given me the opportunity to introduce stylistic improvements and minor corrections into the original published text. I have also added substantially to the final sections in order to bring coverage of recent events up to date and to develop my views about the future of Catalonia. The bibliography has been expanded.

The task of revision and improvement has gained from the encouragement and help of several people. I would like to thank fellow-members of the Anglo-Catalan Society for agreeing to print again. Comments by my friend and teacher Josep Ferrater Mora have been taken to heart. Two reviewers wrote particularly perceptive criticisms of this essay: Lluís Flaquer and Susan DiGiacomo. Jacquie Rees, for her part, generously produced detailed, acute and always pertinent comments on nearly every aspect of these reflections. I am most grateful to her. These and other critical and friendly readers will see that I have not always been able to incorporate all their suggestions into the revised text, for it had to be kept short. But let those comments that have made their way into it be the proof of my gratitude, my *penyora d'amistat*. On the practical side, I wish to record appreciation of the patience and professionalism of Martin Fenwick of the University of Sheffield Printing Unit, in the preparation of the reprint. Finally, thanks go to the *Instituto de España en Londres* for continuing financial support.

S.G.

Summer 1983.

I

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AN OPEN SOCIETY

Modern Catalonia is the result of the conjunction of several large and complex sets of lasting historical phenomena. Several stand out: a very strong feudal past; an indigenous bourgeois industrial revolution; a quasi-permanent subordination of the country to wider political units; a strong degree of national consciousness; a very distinctive culture. These are embodied not only in the language, the literature and the arts, but also in the country's law, political institutions and the quality of its civic life; and a practically constant openness to the influences and migratory influx of neighbouring societies. Any analysis of the modern social structure of Catalonia - together with its politics, economy and culture - must take the interplay of all of these factors into account if it is to make any sense of the country and its present problems.

The fons et origo of the social structure of Catalonia, indeed of its national identity, is feudalism. This is also true of a number of much larger European societies, for example, England and France. As in them, it is the development and decline of the feudal world, giving rise to a certain number of political institutions and opening the way to a bourgeois order, that constituted the source of its later history. From its very beginnings on and around the foothills of the eastern Pyrenees, Catalan society belonged naturally to that feudal core of European society which was destined to transform itself, as if led by an internal logic, into a fully modern, capitalist world. Certain parts of eastern Europe (such as Russia) and most of the Iberian peninsula (Catalonia's own neighbours) only knew a very 'imperfect' and deficient form of feudalism; by the same token they were also countries of painful and retarded capitalist development. Today, the only two areas of the world which have had a true, prolonged, and far-reaching feudal past, western Europe and Japan, have also been the first to consolidate a highly developed form of industrial capitalism. If we consider the early United States historically as an overseas prolongation of one of these ex-feudal societies, England, there seem to be some grounds for supporting the hypothesis that the greater the degree of feudalism achieved by a society

in the past, the more likely it was that capitalism and a bourgeois order would eventually arise in its midst. Be that as it may, the decisive fact is that, from its remote origins (*ca* 800), Catalonia was neither peripheral to feudalism nor marginal to the culture, values, attitudes and institutions that characterised Western Europe in its formative centuries. Neither then nor later must the markedly European character of Catalan life - which has struck and still strikes even the least perceptive of its foreign visitors - be solely attributed to its vicinity to France, as so often is the case. The phenomenon has much deeper roots than that.

Catalonia not only developed into a feudal society, but, by common accord among modern historians, it became one of the most feudal in medieval Europe. Its geopolitical position, however, was from the start quite paradoxical. While to the north early Catalan society found great social and cultural continuities in the French, Occitanian and Provençal worlds - which are, in many senses, still alive today - they were much weaker on the Aragonese flank and practically non-existent on the hostile southern front, then in the hands of Saracens. Later, a long frontier with Castile emerged along the kingdom of Valencia, populated chiefly by Catalans, as well as along the confines of the Aragonese confederation whose hub and hegemonic power Catalonia had become by the late Middle Ages. The Catalan polity became thus confronted with quite a different political unit, whose outlook and internal organisation were linked to a far less feudalised social system. It was precisely this Spanish central power, Castile, which was to become the predominant state in the Peninsula.

Castile's success in uniting all the other Iberian kingdoms - including for a time Portugal - under one state had far-reaching repercussions for the evolution of Catalan society. These included certain forms of stagnation and arrested development to which I shall refer below. Castile's specific medieval features - a united, warlike society, with a mobile frontier, relatively limited political autonomy for the nobility, a class of 'villein knights', and other well-known traits - eventually enabled it to develop one of the earliest modern pre-industrial states of Europe, endowed with a powerful centralist despotic form of government. This, however, hid a number of shortcomings: when the time came for further modernisation (16th to 18th centuries) the state was too clumsy, inefficient and encumbered with parasitical bodies and offices to help carry it out. Modernising reforms were implemented elsewhere in Europe from each political centre according to certain criteria of bureaucratic homogenisation

which stemmed from the Jacobin conception of the state, hypothetically linked to notions of rationality and universalism. In fact such reforms were also linked to criteria of national hegemony over the periphery of each European state. It was thus that the destruction of ethnic and cultural diversity was carried out by the new 'nation state' against a number of smaller subordinate nations and regions all in the name of progressive and rational defeudalisation. Spain joined in this general process of homogenisation, first under the Bourbons by forcibly generalising Castilian law and institutions to the entire territory, and, later, after 1812, by the creation of a modern centralised state. This, however, was done so imperfectly - especially during the period 1812-1931 - that the erosion of the cultural personality of highly differentiated minority areas - namely the Basque country, Catalonia and Galícia - was far less pronounced than that which took place under state action in other similar parts of western Europe.

The stubborn resistance of the Catalans to cultural and political assimilation together with their several revolts, uprisings and wars of national independence (from 1640 to 1714) cannot by themselves explain the permanence of the social and cultural identity of the nation to the degree to which it has been maintained until today. Certainly that part of Catalonia which was ceded in 1659 by Spain to France (after the Treaty of the Pyrenees) has felt the impact of French education, language and institutions to a much greater extent than the rest of the country. One reason for this is that the Roussillon and the other Catalan counties under French administration form a small, demographically weak area which has been cut off from the main centres of Catalan economic and cultural life and has thus become much more vulnerable to external influences. Another, which it would be absurd to ignore, is the strong attraction of the prestigious, powerful and advanced French state as well as the effects of its notorious levelling and administrative skills upon the Northern Catalans. Had Catalonia, south of the Pyrenees, been dominated by a much more efficient and modern state than that of Spain before 1939 - when events took a much more ominous turn for its people - the erosion of its cultural personality, not to speak of its institutions, would have been much more severe than was actually the case. Although Catalonia once achieved, in the now distant past, a much greater degree of political independence than many other European stateless nations of today and even managed to build a sizeable overseas empire for herself, it still failed to become

the fully-fledged country that it might have been. Comparisons with neighbouring Provence quickly come to mind, but also with small countries such as Brittany and Wales which have kept a notable degree of cultural and linguistic differentiation. Yet when in the late 70's both the Welsh and the Catalans were given the opportunity to vote in a national referendum in order to decide in favour of or against a measure of home rule, the former were in two minds, and a majority were against it, whilst the latter were, practically to a man, behind the idea of autonomy in its several forms, ranging from its mildest shades to outright independence. The argument that these two different responses have more to do with the respective nature of the British and the Spanish states, rather than with the character of the minority nations themselves is a sound one, but does not contradict my point. It rather appears to strengthen it.

Before definite political subordination to the Castilian crown took place Catalonia grew and developed as a feudal society. This subordination did not entail the demolition of the internal governmental, juridical and cultural structures of the Principality until its defeat in war by France and Spain in 1714. As in all other feudal societies based on personal relationships of vassalage, a network of contractual bonds held Catalan society together. Already at a very early stage the political culture of the Catalans - noblemen, clerics, peasants, burghers - was based on mutual rights and obligations. The preservation of certain freedoms (in the sense of spheres of action not to be encroached upon; for instance, by lords upon vassals) in one way or another affected the majority of the population. As historians have observed, the early Catalans were already obsessed with covenants, litigations, contracts, claims, counterclaims and appeals to courts and higher authorities. It is no wonder that, together with England, Catalonia was one of the first societies to grant itself what amounted to a written feudal constitution. Yet, the English Magna Carta was preceded by almost one century by the Catalan *Usatges* of 1150 whose very title (the 'uses' and established customs and practices) betrays the fact that the laws the document proclaimed had been already in existence for a very long time. Among these laws, the most outstanding was the explicit acknowledgement of legal equality between burghers and nobility. The burghers (in fact, anyone not a serf) are described as *ciutadans honrats*, honest citizens or, more accurately, men of honour.

The *Usatges* was an essentially pactist law code. Furthermore it was a code that expected everyone in the country to reach agreements and respect each other's rights (often, of course, feudal rights entailing the forms of inequality and exploitation characteristic of feudal economics and politics) rather than to rely on a higher third party's arbitrary will. It was not an individualistic law in the sense that it often saw entire estates, communities and collectivities entering into pacts and covenants with each other. But, like the Magna Carta, it opened the way to a proto-bourgeois and, later, openly bourgeois interpretation of human affairs. Like it too, it could be used, and was used, for the preservation of the privileges of the few against the many, and for the maintenance of bondage and submission. Yet, what mattered in the end, were the potentialities for the development of the trends towards a freer society.

The pactist view of the social order, so neatly embodied in the *Usatges*, consistently continued to appear in public and private Catalan documents throughout the centuries which followed. 'Pactism' as this has been called is the notion that rules are made by parties entering into contracts of their own accord, and also that social life is the result of bargaining among people, and not of unilateral violence and imposition. This became an explicit part of the legal and political life of the Catalan polity, from the councils of its cities - Barcelona first and foremost - to the remotest hamlet. The 'pactist' attitude also became ingrained in Catalan foreign policy, and in the rulers' conception of how business ought to be conducted between the Principality as a whole and the king - be he the sovereign of the Aragonese confederation or, later, that of Spain. The pattern once established between the nominal Frankish sovereigns and the early Catalan counties of the Spanish Marches was thus conveniently kept alive. Above all, contractualism became an essential component of the Catalan way of life and the institutionalised life of the people, as they dealt with each other as free members of each *foc* - hearth, or family - and each lineage. It was often linked to the patrimonial concept of property, as embodied in the *mas* or *masia*, or manor, whether owned by commoner or nobleman. The *mas*, the traditional economic and family unit of rural Catalonia, was based on patriarchal law and traditions - *dret pairal* - and became the backbone of the Catalan pre-industrial world. What is remarkable is the measure of survival through the ages of contractualism, be it patrimonial or individualist, through Catalan civil law, a law that even the Francoist dictatorship in the 20th century did not dare dismantle completely.

All this, of course, poses problems of interpretation. One of them is the danger of idealisation, to which even certain avowedly 'materialist' historians have not been entirely immune. Thus *pairalisme* as a doctrine - the affirmation of a simple imaginary and virtuous past, in a society of happy *masos* - is a ruralistic and bucolic distortion which played an important political or ideological role in the early formulation of modern Catalanism. Another danger is the exaggeration of the role of 'pactism' in Catalan life, past and present, as if it were some sort of timeless and invariable ideology, essential to the 'national character' of the Catalans. So much has been said about the question of 'pactism' that it has become a vexed one. I do not wish to add to it here, as I am only interested in stating the obvious, namely that there is a recognisable contractualist stance in certain key Catalan institutions and that the frequently contractualist, bargaining attitude of Catalan social forces, to this very day, is easily noticeable. Therefore, it would seem useful to take contractualism into account as a relatively stable cultural pattern amongst others, as a way of understanding social inequality and civil strife in Catalonia in recent times, as well as the strategies, frustrations and accommodations of its several political, cultural and economic elites in their dealings with the central powers of the state.

In no way does all this imply that the 'pactism' to which Catalans are said to be so prone possesses a magic quality that makes their country an idyllic place to live in. For one thing, 'pactism' is hardly more pronounced there than the kind of contractualism and readiness for realistic bargaining and coalition formation that one finds in other profoundly bourgeois societies, for instance, the Netherlands. For another, whenever circumstances have become too critical, it has simply broken down. Thus, at the height of the juridical and political consolidation of 'pactism', during the 15th century, open class warfare and civil war gripped the Catalan capital and accelerated its decline as a maritime power and commercial emporium. The uncompromising representatives of the *Busca* (the party of artisans, workers and small shopkeepers) and those of the *Biga* (the party of patricians and merchants) were, however, the immediate heirs of those men who had turned Barcelona into one of the great centres of civilised urban government, fostering advanced forms of medieval and early Renaissance parliamentarianism, international maritime and commercial law, and curtailing the powers of absolute kingship.

The transition from early medieval contractualism to the more individualistic contractualism typical of advanced liberal societies was, however, more imperfect in Catalonia than elsewhere. When the time arrived for such transition, the economic and political conditions of Mediterranean Europe in general and of Catalonia; in particular were not very favourable to it. Subordination to the Spanish crown since the Renaissance put the Catalans on the defensive: above all they wanted to preserve their freedoms and institutions and, in order to do that, they had to show their Hapsburg rulers and their ministers that they themselves respected their own laws and political constitution (*constitucions i drets de Catalunya*) and therefore were not breaking the compact that bound them to their sovereign. Once again, all very 'pactist'. But this meant freezing institutions as they were. Thus, the respect for the free peasantry, or more correctly, the class of independent farmers (*pagesia*) for which the country was renowned meant the maintenance and enforcement of non-individualist laws in the countryside: lineage, kinship and patrimony were to remain first and foremost criteria of loyalty. The heir (*hereu*) was responsible for the entire family and his tenants (*masovers, mossos* and others) and was bound to them. Some side-effects of this did promote individualism, such as the stream of enterprising younger brothers (*fadristerns* and *cabalers*) who emigrated to Barcelona in search of work and fortune with money given to them by their elder brother, the *hereu*. This stream was not essentially different from that which nourished the life of London in the same pre-industrial period. Yet, on the whole, the prevailing economic and political attitudes became much more familistic than truly individualistic in Catalonia, even through the decisive period of its early industrialisation.

The partially 'arrested' nature of the evolution of Catalan society towards advanced individualism - the competitive, possessive individualism of high capitalism - can therefore be traced back to the country's subordination to the Spanish monarchy. Thus besides the gulf in attitudes and political conceptions that separated the hegemonic central power, Castile, from the peripheral Principality, there were clear barriers to the economic development of the latter. Catalonia's merchant classes were partially excluded from the 'primitive accumulation of capital' for a long time as a result of the ban imposed on its subjects to trade from its ports with the Spanish colonies until late in the 18th century. Economically, this measure was no doubt to the lasting detriment of all the Spains, including

not least the large seaborne empire of Castile. However there were other factors, which had nothing to do with the early Spanish state and which were perhaps equally grave: above all the collapse of western Mediterranean trade after the Ottoman expansion. This partially 'arrested' transition of Catalan society from feudalism into capitalism did not stop at the ossification of the once flourishing early bourgeois structures, but also, more seriously, entailed the retarded and, until the First World War, uneven penetration of the Catalan countryside itself by the forces of urban, lay, liberal modernity. That, to a large extent, explains the strength of Carlism in Catalonia and the other Catalan lands, Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Carlism was supported in the rural areas because it asserted a populistic defence of the traditional rights (*furs*) of those areas, but it was also an ultramontane, reactionary, legitimistic, antiliberal movement. Carlism was even stronger in the Basque country, and for similar reasons. Therefore, the 'modernity' of Catalan culture and the readiness with which some Catalans have embraced 'progressive' causes and avant-garde movements of all kinds (often without foreign mimetism, as if to the manner born, as the history of their art, thought and letters bears witness) is not a simple matter. But this is not the place to unravel in detail the unique admixture of values embodied in the culture of Catalonia.

The contradictions of Catalan economic and political values through time have been compounded by the all-important fact that the country is very small as is its population. From time immemorial, whenever external competitors or enemies had to be confronted - through raising armies, levying taxes, winning parliamentary seats at the Spanish Cortes - the Catalans had to fall back on diplomacy, cunning, patience, manoeuvring and appeasement. Sometimes, even collective survival within a recognisably Catalan body politic - no matter how circumscribed - depended on the exercise of such skills. This recurring factor in the history of the country must be kept in mind if we wish to understand the interplay of the class and political forces of today, for it profoundly affects their alliances, compromises and cautious confrontations. From its small corner in the Iberian peninsula, Catalonia has had to face a powerful, unified state which, unlike Lombardy and Piedmont in Italy, it could never dream of dominating in political terms, or of endowing with a steady political leadership, although some, briefly and tentatively, thought that possible in the 19th century. Instead, it could try to transform the rest of Spain into a captive capitalist market for the products of its industry, by getting the government

to close it to foreign competitors. That was, of course, the option eventually taken by most of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Protectionism, again, as we shall see, induced entrepreneurial apathy by the removal of competition.

A great abyss separates certain progressive countries, open to innovation, and rooted in democratic traditions, yet small and politically subordinate, from those others which, endowed with the same qualities, have had a state they can call their own. Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark belong to this latter category, but Bohemia and Catalonia are in the former. Czechs and Catalans have that much in common in their past, at opposite extremes of the European continent. The people of such small 'advanced' stateless nations must find their collective identity by falling back on the institutions of their civil societies, as public and state institutions are alien and often hostile to them. This search for a common identity and strength results also in the conscious participation of the people in many symbolic acts of ethno-cultural affirmation. In this respect Catalonia must be one of the very few industrial countries where the progress of technology and capitalism has not meant the relegation of a vast number of traditional festivities, dances and ritualistic games of all sorts either to remote rural areas, or to certain pockets of the popular classes. Some of these rituals, like the *sardana*, the national dance, in which rich and poor, old and young, men and women, participate in one single unbroken circle, have still not retreated from the busiest squares and thoroughfares of Barcelona, Perpignan, Tarragona, to this day. Others, like the competitions between human towers (*castells*) once confined to certain areas seem to be actually spreading now, benefiting, rather than suffering, from the attention they receive from the media.

The relevance of these collective signs of identity may seem secondary to any analysis of the social structure of a country. Their close relationship, however, with active and popular forms of political affirmation in the long periods of cultural subjugation, and especially when cultural genocide was attempted after 1939, cannot be overlooked. Much less so their obvious relationship to the proliferation of voluntary associations throughout Catalonia, for many of them are especially devoted to the maintenance of such traditions, rituals, games, dances and festivities. Yet, the extremely high number of voluntary associations to be found in the country stems, once again, from the remarkably modern texture of Catalan society. Thus, while some clubs and 'eisteddfods' - *colles sardanistes*, *esbarts*, *colles de castellers* - must be related to those fraternities which are typical of the social and cultural anthropology of many Mediterranean societies, others

are much more characteristic of the urban industrial order. Catalonia possesses an exceptional number of voluntary associations devoted to the most varied of peaceful pursuits: choirs, mountaineering clubs, pigeon-fancying clubs, small public libraries (privately funded), co-operatives of all sorts, philatelic associations, theatrical societies, local and civic action groups, and geographical and astronomical amateurs' clubs. Furthermore, the Catalan bourgeoisie has also created its own exclusive institutions, ranging from the great Barcelona opera house, the Liceu - opened in 1844 and the only one in Europe which is neither supported by public funds nor by the state - to expensive aero-clubs at Reus and Sabadell. Besides, the intense 'private associationism' of the Catalans shows an unbroken line from the period of ancient guilds and civic trade centres. (Thus the great Gothic exchange markets of Perpignan, Barcelona, Valencia, Majorca, the *lloges de contractació*, are among the most important buildings of Catalan architecture. The modern Barcelona stock exchange is still located in the ancient Gothic 'lodge' or *llotja*. Indeed, as in Northern Italy and the Netherlands, civic architecture, linked either to trade and banking or to patrician or 'democratic' government - as witness the Generalitat, the Consell de Cent and other public buildings - is an essential part of the Catalan man-made landscape.) In a manner not unrelated to these 'associational' characteristics of Catalan life, there are certain attitudes - a great love of nature and the countryside - which result in a proliferation of botanists, birdwatchers, local historians and antiquarians. All this must come as no surprise to any northern European, where such attitudes and institutions are absolutely normal, and must make Catalonia, I am sure, look rather uninteresting and far less exotic than other Mediterranean lands: it is, however, a source of wonder and of a somewhat naive pride to the acutely self-conscious Catalans themselves.

The ordinary people of Catalonia tend openly to recognise themselves as a community in this complex network of habits, customs, tenuously enforced civil laws and cultural inclinations. Their proverbial fondness for hard work, careful spending and profitable investment, of course, also plays a prominent part in their self-image. Taken together, their collective virtues are neither very heroic nor very dramatic. They are, after all, only 'secondary' virtues. Yet they are precisely the virtues which happen to have largely made western societies what they are today. In fact the open identification of the Catalans with these acknowledged traits of national character is at least as strong as their intense linguistic attachment: no one can really be called a Catalan who does not speak the language - a condition that

does not always obtain in other minority nations of Europe. Together, language and perceived 'national character', make up what is invariably called the 'differential fact' (*fet diferenciat*) or 'uniqueness' of Catalonia. This seems to have become even more so now, when massive immigration from the south and great industrialisation elsewhere in Spain have apparently blurred many differences. In the past, certain traditionalist and romantic observers were inclined to add other traits to the alleged uniqueness of Catalan society, principally religious ones, but in this they may have erred. Religion, like music or architecture, is certainly 'different' in Catalonia. Yet, unlike in Poland or Ireland, Catalan religiosity does not differ in essence from that of those neighbouring countries with which tensions have developed through history. Accordingly, religion never became a primordial collective focus of Catalan communal identification, though it was used, occasionally, to satisfy popular demands - the right to have native bishops - or to rally around national symbols, such as Our Lady of Montserrat.

The picture that emerges from this general preliminary overview is that of a society whose historical development led, to a considerable extent, towards a form of class capitalist order which is quite common elsewhere. Taken in isolation from the strain and strife of industrialisation, capitalist confrontations, exploitations and tensions between the state and large sectors of the Catalan people, such a picture would be highly misleading. It must therefore be understood only in the framework of what I have to say next, which certainly will present a less harmonious and happy image of Catalan society. Before I embark on that perhaps more realistic task, however, it seems convenient to sum up what has been said by remembering that the traditional and still living patterns of Catalan life thus far pointed out are also, to a large extent, those we often attribute to an open society. An open society may be defined as one in which there is a considerable variety of options and life-chances for many of its members, whose diverse opinions may be expressed freely, and whose behaviour is not entirely controlled by an intolerant polity. Open societies hinge upon the overt recognition of individual responsibility, privacy and citizenship as collective values for the conduct of human affairs. No known collectivity embodies perfectly the virtues of such a society, though some approach it more than others. Despite a great number of external constraints and internal limitations Catalonia must surely be counted among those countries which have managed with relative success to approximate to the distant ideal.

II

SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE RISE OF CATALAN INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

Political and economic decline began in the late 14th century, brought about to a large extent in Catalonia, as in other parts of Europe, by successive waves of the Great Plague. The Principality had almost half a million people in 1365. This figure had been reduced to just over 300,000 by the beginning of the 16th century. By 1479 the population of Barcelona had sunk to an all time low of 20,000. Even certain outwardly progressive events which took place in those times were, in fact, signs of retrenchment. For instance, at the start of the period of decline (the *Decadència*), in 1381, a novel and apparently more advanced credit institution was set up on Barcelona, the *taula de canvi* ('exchange bench' or bank) which actually allowed merchants to fall back on the municipal chest as a guarantor for their mounting risks and losses. Yet the downhill process - which lasted till the beginning of the 18th century - was far from being regressive in every sense. The ferocious civil wars of the *remences* (farmers or *pagesos* who refused to remain vassals forever, with no chance of redemption through work or payment to their landlords) were put to an end, by royal arbitration, in favour of the peasants (*Sentència arbitral de Guadalupe*, 1486). This may have reflected a pattern of alliance between royal power and the populace against the nobility which was well in character with the rise of the modern state, but it enhanced the liberties of the majority. This process of 'popular liberation', however, did not take place in the other kingdoms of the Spanish crown, where an often landless and rightless peasantry had no burghers to form alliances with, nor kings ready to face a semi-autonomous, caste-like nobility. This, among other causes, stands at the root of the great historical paradox: southern European areas like the Alentejo, Andalusia, and Sicily, whose ancient political and economic structure had been far less feudal than lands further to the north, presented, centuries later, a much more archaic character than they. This may be the reason why we so often see these southern regions loosely and erroneously described as 'feudal' or 'semifeudal' in modern times.

The loss of protagonism in internal affairs through Castile's rise as an hegemonic power within Spain and as an imperial state in Europe and overseas entailed a deliberate effort, on the part of the Catalans, to 'freeze' their institutions, keep their privileges and secure from each successive king the recognition of their rights. In the process, a minimal degree of coordination of strategies with the other Catalan countries and with the forever friendly Aragonese confederates became impossible. Spain's policies in the Mediterranean passed over to the Castilians: they were the ones who led the wars in Italy and the war of containment against the Turk, though the Catalan parliament dutifully raised at each step the taxes needed from the Principality. While other patrician republics or kingdoms on the Atlantic seafront were thriving - Holland and even some Mediterranean emporia, namely Venice and Genoa, were managing to survive the bad times quite well - Barcelona and its hinterland closed up: the guilds became sclerotic, the merchant classes utterly unadventurous and bands of brigands sprang up in the countryside.

The end of the War of Independence against the combined Bourbon forces of France and Spain (1714) has rightly been seen as the lowest point in the history of the Catalans. Their rights were abolished, the use of Spanish was imposed for any official transactions. Castilian law was enforced, and a great number of their institutions were destroyed. The Catalan Parliament, one of the oldest in Europe, and the 'cabinet' within it, the *Generalitat*, was dissolved. (As a 'representative' assembly, passing laws non-revokable by the king, the Catalan parliament is a dozen years older than Westminster.) Besides all this, of course, the country was severely damaged by more than a century of dislocations, warfare and stagnation.

This is, however, only half the picture. As is often the case with disasters of such proportions, vast pent-up energies were let loose as soon as certain barriers fell down and the backward-looking ruling classes had shown their incompetence. After 1714 the Catalan polity ceased to be subordinate: it simply ceased to exist. The aristocracy also fell with it, and disappeared or was absorbed into the Spanish nobility forever. Monopolistic guilds, unadventurous traders, legalistic clerics and advocates, attached to a cumbersome maze of archaic privileges, all lost more than a measure of power. And the country as a whole, in which demographic recovery had already taken place, possessed certain key social classes which, now unshackled, were able to transform it completely in the decades to come. Catalonia now had its free *pagesia*, the land-owning farmers and peasants

who never constituted the poor rural proletariat found elsewhere in the Peninsula. Catalan *pagesos* were (and still are) a level-headed lot, jealously entrenched in their properties. They possessed a near capitalist mentality about their produce. This was especially true of the northern half of the country (the *Catalunya vella*) where the land tenure patterns reinforced these general attitudes. It also had its *menestralia*, that most Catalan of social classes, then as well as in later times, made up of artisans, shopkeepers, workshop owners. The Catalan *menestrals*, combining individualism with familism, thoroughly committed to the work ethic and imbued with a characteristic respect for the methodic accumulation of wealth through savings, once they were freed by the abolition of the guilds and the final loosening up of the market, showed a mentality and outlook not altogether different from that usually attributed to the Puritans, though the latter's special brand of protestant piety was absent. Often enough, the same families of the *menestralia* harboured in them a profound ambivalence of attitudes to life and raised, under the same roof, philistines and poets, petty civil servants and adventurous captains of industry. They were the real product of the final breakdown of feudal society and not the once great patrician burghers and merchants of Catalonia, now apathetic and timid, bewildered and defeated after three or more generations of adversity.

From the latter the *menestralia* inherited and carried over into the emerging new world the contractualist approach as well as a stubborn attachment to their land and an awareness of its historical continuity and uniqueness. Yet, their true contribution to the shaping of the life of modern Catalonia had hardly anything to do with the maintenance of tradition. It was, rather, entirely new, for they transformed their country into an industrial society. For the student of history, the ultimate significance of capitalism and the industrial revolution in Catalonia is that neither was an imported phenomenon. A certain amount of conscious foreign imitation can indeed be detected in early Catalan industrial capitalism, which stands in sharp contrast to the indifferent, if not hostile attitude to modernisation prevalent in some neighbouring areas. Yet, the eager search for external models, ideas, tools and machinery only goes to show that the modernising mentality and the social classes ready to implement change were already there. Capitalism first, and then the industrial revolution itself - circumscribed and small as they are bound to look by comparison to parallel phenomena in England and America - were both indigenous to Catalonia. Perhaps even more so than they were, initially, to the only other

Mediterranean society, Lombardy and Piedmont in northern Italy, which developed naturally, as it were, a modern bourgeois class society.

By the start of the Spanish Civil War, in 1936, the class system of Catalan society was largely the result of the superimposition of three different and successive long waves of industrialisation and capital accumulation, with the attendant growth of new factory-linked centres, the massive importance of the workforce, the consolidation of a skilled working class and a large middle class, together with further advances in the direction of secularisation and urbanisation. These three long waves entailed, respectively, the following developments: (a) the growth of an early bourgeois class, throughout the 18th century, with a considerable advance in the diversification of tasks and occupations; (b) the rise of an industrial society based, at first, as in so many other places, on the textile industry, which went hand in hand with the establishment of great family fortunes and an industrial oligarchy confronting a proletariat, vast even by European standards; and (c) further differentiation in industry beginning with the introduction of the chemical industry and electrification before the Great War, linked to finance capitalism (national and international) but still retaining its firm links with the local bourgeoisie. In the early 1980's any observer of Catalan life can still detect clear signs of both the achievements and the scars of each one of these three great historical periods. Together, these overlapping stages of the Catalan economy gave the country - and indirectly the rest of Spain as well - much of its present shape and possibilities. Let us look briefly at each one of them.

(a) Strictly speaking, bourgeois society in 18th-century Spain was restricted to two enclaves, the merchant classes of Cadiz and the Catalan trading and manufacturing entrepreneurial community. (The 'enclave' nature of both industrialism and bourgeois society in the southern European countries has been a key structural feature of all of them until well after the Second World War.) The Catalan bourgeois classes, far less *comprador* in nature than their Andalusian counterparts, were coming into their own already around 1730 and expanded throughout this period, which came to an end with the Napoleonic invasion. The rise in prices, the great growth in international trade, coupled with the maintenance of wages at their traditional level, allowed the great surge in capital investment and systematic reinvestment which laid the foundations of an indigenous capitalist system. (Wages were kept low by an influx of immigrants from both sides of the Pyrenees who were attracted by the availability of jobs: whilst large scale

immigration had occurred at earlier times, the unbroken modern pattern began then.) Well before Catalonia was finally allowed to trade with the Empire - at the amazingly and revealingly late date of 1778 - its protobourgeois and bourgeois classes were actively engaged in the capitalist transformation of the economy. Its industrial side was based on cotton and silk. Certain traditional industries, such as the old *farga* ironworks of the interior ('primitive' Catalan forges, with a wide reputation for quality) provided much needed support both in kind and in expertise.

As I pointed out earlier, the 'protagonists' of this change were the *menestrals*, especially in terms of initiative and upward mobility. Just like their counterparts in Lancashire, many Catalan captains of industry and founders of bourgeois dynasties were of 'humble' origin, i.e. artisans turned mechanics at the head of workshops. Moreover, the definitive debilitation of the economic privileges of church and nobility - though some important vestigial ones were retained by the ecclesiastic establishment for many years to come - also implied the 'embourgeoisement' of classes once linked to the old order. Thus, among the new entrepreneurial strata one can find besides *menestrals* and the more prosperous 'honest burghers' (*ciutadans honrats*) (or their children, as could be expected) a squirearchy and land-owning nobility most eager to profit from the new economy. Once more, the favourable attitude of the latter towards business and capitalist profit through their own exertions glaringly contrasts with the disdain and indifference shown by other traditional upper classes, both in Spain and elsewhere at the time. It should not be concluded, however, that this difference in attitude between the peripheral Catalan upper classes and the aristocratic castes who controlled the *ancien regime* Spanish state from the centre was bound to produce only conflict. Catalan entrepreneurs and traders were now enjoying the opportunities of both the peninsular and the imperial markets and therefore found a greater loyalty to the Crown. Thus when the French revolution broke out the Catalan bourgeoisie sided with the conservative forces, and revolutionary sympathies became confined to the few. The wisdom of such a choice was confirmed very soon, with the influx of French *emigre* capital into Catalonia. Vast opportunities opened up in overseas trade and sales when Spain became free of all competition from French manufacturers, especially cloth.

This short-lived period of intense prosperity and growth at the expense of France's crisis has a special significance, for it fits a recurring pattern: industrial and semi-industrial societies outside the north-west European

core area of modern capitalism have always benefited in the past from periods when monopoly was suspended or foreign competition slackened. When the hegemonic competitors raised their heads again (as after 1918) lesser industrial societies tended to suffer deep crises and depression. Yet, each wave of expansion at the expense of a great industrial power's crisis allowed for a new burst in industrialisation whose creations: (new industries, finance institutions, and the development of new markets) never wholly disappeared.

, (b) The Napoleonic war had very damaging consequences for Catalonia, one of the areas where fighting was fiercest. Subsequent colonial losses and extreme political instability in Spain brought a severe lack of markets and outlets for the economy. The new capitalist order, however, had gathered too much momentum for the youthful Catalan bourgeoisie to be easily thrown into disarray. Their representatives were fully aware that only ceaseless innovation and reinvestment could save them, and engaged in these twin activities with a vigour they would perhaps never possess again. This is truly the period of the *bourgeoisie conquérante* in Catalonia (ca. 1828-1918), especially in its early phases, when important sectors of it showed adventurourness, did not always fear radicalism, and supported progressive causes - from federalism to republicanism. These groups not only managed to emulate, but also to equal and in some fields even to surpass the deeds of their sister classes in other countries. Their achievements include national and international trade fairs, the first railway in Spain (1848: Barcelona-Mataró), irrigation canals in western Catalonia (*Canal d'Urgell*, 1843), the establishment of employers' federations, industrial research institutions and polytechnics. The splendid and futuristic urbanisation of Barcelona, (*Pla Cerdà*, 1859) still called by its popular name of *Eixample*, ('widening' of the city), lends the Catalan capital today - together with its medieval, so-called 'gothic' quarters - its most characteristic profile. All these and other achievements were, of course, privately initiated, funded and carried out. The state did not help - it viewed its Catalan subjects with a mixture of diffidence, amazement, and perhaps envy - and concentrated its efforts elsewhere, though at least it did not always thwart private initiative or try to frustrate bourgeois intentions. All this brought with it a genteel and solid bourgeois culture, as profoundly established among the rungs of the new industrial, mercantile and financial oligarchy as among those of the urban middle classes. They were as sensitive to music, art, science and literature, as their counterparts

elsewhere in Europe. Their conversion to Catalanism, after 1868, was inextricably linked to these cultural characteristics. In fact the Catalanist doctrine has remained linked to language, culture and education ever since, though its political and economic dimensions came to play a greater role in later times. They left us a number of conspicuous signs of their conceptions and ideology especially in architecture and urban design. Some, like the *Parc de la Ciutadella*, are full of peaceful political symbolism: it is the public park erected where the massive citadel built by the Bourbon conquerors to keep the unruly Catalans at bay once stood. Others betray an international 'Victorian' design not excessively original though full of civic pride, especially as they became the cultural and social institutions of capitals much smaller than the macrocephalic *Cap i Casal* (Head and Home) of the Catalans. The *Centre de Lectura*, the renowned library and cultural institute at Reus, is one of them. Still other constructions, towards the end of this period, combine in themselves extreme haste - as if to show the world the precarious equilibrium which always beset the entire bourgeois enterprise in Catalonia - with extreme originality: such as the case of *modernisme*, that Catalan *art nouveau* movement, which makes Barcelona one of its chief European capitals. 'Modernism' was not confined to cafes, sumptuous town houses, spas and decorative art, but found its best expression in concert halls such as the *Palau de la Música* or the fascinating explorations into architectural mysticism of Antoni Gaudí's world-famous temple. Many Catalans look on those hundred-odd years as a period which received the apt name of *Renaixença*, (a not altogether dissimilar expression to the Italian *Rinascita*, and for somewhat similar reasons), with an awe as great as that with which much earlier 'imperial' times are frequently looked upon.

Needless to say, all this represents only one facet of the story. From 1812 to 1914, the rise of industrial society in Catalonia was a painfully complicated affair. There was a Catalan backward countryside which embraced legitimism, the ultramontane cause of Carlism. Its only saving grace was perhaps the populist and 'federalist' assertion of the traditional rights and liberties (*furs*) of the small nation; indeed, it was from this, as well as from fanatical anti-liberal Catholicism, that it drew its strength. Then there was the eternal question of the archaic state, brutal in its reactions to workers' demands, slow and uncomprehending in its dealings with the ruling classes of Catalonia, whose outlook seemed so different, and whose strength in the state capital was always circumscribed and

peripheral. Powerful industrialists and financiers seemed forever forced to spend much of their precious time making representations in Madrid, and always had to be ready to set out on often frustrating and time-wasting pilgrimages to the seat of government. Thus the reformist attitude of the bourgeoisie was challenged from many quarters, ranging from the relative backwardness of much of their own Catalan hinterland - where a manorial economy founded its ideological bearings on Catholic clericalism and a reactionary farmers' populism, the so-called *pairalisme* - to the ineptitude and lack of understanding of the political leaders of the state. The latter were more often than not attached to the interests of the non-entrepreneurial southern landlords or to those of a growing financial oligarchy, which drew its strength from state enterprises and contracts. (Certain state contracts, such as army uniforms, did indeed benefit the local textile industry, but others, from railways to public works, were far more restricted to the Madrid-based investors.) The chronically low acquisitive power of the Spanish market did not help either: there was no substantial middle class outside Catalonia that would boost its wealth by buying Catalan products in a more significant quantity, so that an economic 'overspill' of minimal proportions, reaching the lower classes, could finally take place. The enclave nature of the advanced economy in Spain thus continued unmodified.

The endemic tension with the political ruling groups in the state capital bred a measure of ideological schizophrenia among the Catalan industrialists. For the reasons just given their reformism soon became half-hearted and lacked the support of the more backward-looking, albeit far more powerful oligarchy of Madrid. Yet its support had to be sought whenever confrontations with the growing proletariat became inevitable. The brutality of governmental military intervention - first illustrated by General Espartero's ruthless bombardment of Barcelona in 1842, and the ensuing terror - made a more peaceful resolution of the tensions between the two ruling classes increasingly more difficult, but especially between the industrialists and the wage-earners. So much so that by the end of the period, on the eve of the First World War, despair and scepticism seemed to be setting in everywhere. The attempts at political reform and 'regeneration' on the part of the enlightened Majorcan prime-minister Antoni Maura bore little fruit and ended in any case with the vast spontaneous uprising of the Barcelona proletariat, the so-called Tragic Week of 1909. The execution of Ferrer i Guàrdia, anarchist educationalist and

founder of a famous school, as 'morally responsible' for the events was only one of the more sensational aspects of the brutal repression. The workers, though disheartened, formed in the following year the National Confederation of Labour, or C.N.T., a vast anarchist trade union, thoroughly sceptical of the established order, or indeed of any established 'bourgeois' order.

(c) Belatedly, between the years 1875 and 1918, Spain saw the final emergence of a modern economy on its soil. In the preceding decades Catalonia had failed to diversify its enterprises out of the original basis of the textile industry. It had also failed to turn the rest of Spain into a fully modern bourgeois country either through greater commercial penetration or through direct political action by its elites. (The ultimate fate of the policies of the Catalan, General Joan Prim, after he deposed Isabel II in 1868, introduced universal suffrage and established a short-lived constitutional monarchy, epitomises the limitations and constraints of the always problematic 'Catalanisation' of the Spanish state.) All-round economic growth began with the addition of a new, second focus of industrialism, once again on the periphery of the state, in the Basque country. Yet, the concerted efforts of the Bilbao ironmasters, heavy and light industry entrepreneurs and bankers to shake off their considerable dependence from abroad (foreign investment in the Basque country had been vital from the start for its industrial take-off) did not bear all the fruit they wished, so that a fully autonomous bourgeoisie did not emerge during this period. Nevertheless, the consequences of Basque industrialisation were truly momentous for the modern history of all Spain, for it now had not just one but two industrial areas which also happened to be linguistically and culturally distinct. The superimposition of local nationalistic claims upon the class demands of capitalist industrial society often exacerbates social conflict. This certainly became the case in Spain with all its structural and cultural varieties. In fact, it could be claimed that in the early stages of industrialisation and modernisation Spain's cultural, class and political heterogeneity increased rather than diminished, precisely as a consequence of the trends in uneven economic and political development which were then rapidly taking place.

Meanwhile, over the rest of Spain, mining, the railway system, a number of service industries and the administrative apparatus continued to grow. The former two were often in the hands of foreigners, while the state was hardly ever free from foreign loans. All this meant that the degree of

dependent economic development to which Spain became subjected was very high indeed: in the end the country joined the international capitalist industrial system in a largely subordinate capacity. Restricted economic sovereignty or, to put it more mildly, endemic international economic pressures on the policies of any Spanish government, became an established feature of political life. In the long run, this was bound to provoke strong nationalistic, protofascist feelings on the right, and internationalist, revolutionary, feelings on the left. Under such circumstances the odds against Catalan industrial capitalism pulling it off, as it were, and turning Spain into something more than a second-rate industrial power were immense. In spite of demographic growth, cheap labour (kept cheap by a seemingly endless flow of immigrants), sustained reinvestment, and clear efforts at diversification (chemicals, machinery, mining, hydroelectric plants, modern intensive agriculture, all began to flourish in Catalonia during this 'third period'), other, more serious structural limitations arose: coal was scarce and low in calories, iron ore from neighbouring Sagunt, in northern Valencia, was neither plentiful nor able to compete with the soaring Basque metallurgical and machinery industries.

The unenlightened, callous and often cruel attitude of the European bourgeoisies towards their workers, who were chiefly seen as producers, not consumers, of goods, was aggravated and lasted longer in areas such as Catalonia, where many adverse factors were at work. The beginnings of repression and hostility against the working class were, in spite of several serious incidents, perhaps not worse than anywhere else. Yet with the start of the last period of bourgeois ascendancy, in the 1870's, attitudes hardened. The limits to growth and capitalist transformation in Catalonia were becoming apparent to the industrialists. Accordingly the newly-formed oligarchy settled for protectionism and became reluctant to accept mergers, takeovers, and the other strategies which characterise the successful transition to advanced capitalism. The (familistic structure of Catalan industry, banking, and business enterprise was therefore not undermined, and the ultimate failure of the industrial bourgeoisie was sealed. Of course, relatively large joint-stock companies continued to grow, but the general tone thereafter (with the short parenthesis of the Great War years) was one of timidity, familistic and individualistic possessiveness and, above all, simple-minded authoritarianism towards the workers. These attitudes were linked to a chronic incapacity to understand their plight and a failure to comprehend how convenient it would have been to negotiate wages

with them and furthermore to foster and protect the important moderate sectors of the Catalan proletariat.

Catalan workers were, in their majority, remarkably moderate over this period. 'Moderate' should not be interpreted as apathetic or apolitical in the sense often given to the notion of 'silent majority'. Quite the opposite was the case. Nineteenth-century Catalan workers developed a specific civic culture of their own, whose complex richness cannot be recounted in a few words. It was, in more senses than one, the kind of phenomenon which would now be called an 'alternative' culture. Co-operatives, athenaeums, choirs, mutual-aid societies, self-advancement and educational institutes sprang up all over the country and often as individual Catalan workers - especially anarchists - were banned to the remotest parts of the Spain, they also influenced and 'spread the word' outside. Although, in the earlier phases of industrialisation, Utopian movements (hoping to found happy communes in America in some instances) were not unknown, a practical sense, thrift, and the preaching of a virtuous life predominated. As Catholicism could not be the religious basis of this morality - the Church sided with reaction and never showed the slightest understanding of the working people - anarchism took its place. Yet, being Catalan, anarchism became a practical task of mutual aid, workers' management and a cult of 'culture' and learning. Darwinian ideas, vegetariansim, Esperanto, internationalism, naturism, all mixed in the formation of this secular religion. This to a considerable extent 'alternative' culture of the Catalan working classes - which was especially strong among the skilled workers and certain sectors of industry, such as printing - was moderate in the sense that it did not preach violence. Rather it emphasised constructive activities alongside strikes and peaceful demonstrations, though it was certainly radical in so far as it was geared towards the development of a new social order.

The radical, even revolutionary potential of the political culture generated by the Catalan workers was destined to underpin a series of social movements which came to the fore later, when class and ideological polarisation led to civil war. Yet during the years 1875-1931 this culture remained an undercurrent, however conspicuous and powerful. The tragedy of the Catalan working classes over that period was that their cultural and political virtues were almost thoroughly wasted. They managed to build a relatively protective universe around themselves, and were invariably at the head of the labour movement in Spain, but given the other constraints

of the larger society, their achievements were always curtailed. The range and originality of their activities, from the publication of working class newspapers to the foundation and organisation of the first trades union - socialist and anarchist - schools, co-operatives, and the rest, may be impressive, but, under the circumstances, the upper hand and the limelight of working class action was stolen by the desperadoes, the conspirators, the bomb-throwing anarchists.

After the fall of the First Republic, in 1874, and in a pitched battle, the army smashed the last focus of working class and liberal radical resistance at Sarrià, on the outskirts of Barcelona. Until 1936 that was to be the last case of an active alliance between the progressive liberals and the local proletariat. The impossibility of such an alliance - peaceful or otherwise - only aggravated the 'moderate' though oppositional workers. Every bout of blind repression now tended to be openly applauded by the oligarchy as well as by large sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. From the workers' standpoint official terrorism seemed to give the lie to those among their ranks who preached patience and the construction of a just society through an essentially peaceful albeit long and tenacious struggle. Arbitrary official courts and private bourgeois terrorists also precipitated the complete loss of confidence in the state all over Spain. In fact, capitalism, the rich, the para-military Civil Guard, the administration of justice, the Church and the army, were increasingly seen as institutions indistinguishable from each other, all forming part of one single, conspiratorial league. I cannot analyse here the causes for the success of anarchism in Spain, especially as so much has already been said on the subject, but the triumph of this ideology both in Andalusia and in Catalonia was strengthened by that complete lack of faith in public institutions and the identification of diverse groups to form one undifferentiated whole. The state and the rich, regardless of the regime, were the enemy. And the Church, with all its pomp and conspicuous presence, the butt. Temples could be easily burnt, convents assaulted; army barracks, on the other hand, were not so accessible to the wrath of a permanently frustrated populace. But not only churches were burnt. Thus, in spite of some victories and concessions on the labour front, won after serious strikes, the post-war years saw the degeneration of industrial conflict into gangsterism and terrorism. The anarchist CNT, led by the Noi del Sucre ('Sugar Boy' Salvador Seguí) and Angel Pestaña preached 'direct action' against the bourgeoisie after 1918: such action was not necessarily meant to entail violence but, inevitably, it led to it when

certain employers, helped no doubt by general Martinez Anido - who acted as an autocratic viceroy in Catalonia - chose to hire assassins in order to sow terror among the workers. This decision opened the terrible period of *pistolisme*, or open and random 'class' warfare (1919-1925), carried out by hiring gunmen and ideological fanatics, culminating in 1922, when over 825 attacks or assassinations were recorded.

Well before this violent polarisation took place the middle classes had already begun to embrace Catalanism (modern Catalan nationalism) as their main political creed. They were followed in this ideological shift, though more cautiously, by the upper classes with their own brand of regionalism. For reasons of class interest, fear of government repression, and links with religion and the traditionalist countryside, the increasingly more Catalanist middle classes showed a remarkable and self-defeating inability to join forces with the 'moderate' workers. These were never included in any programme of Catalan autonomy during the decades preceding the Second Republic in 1931. They therefore remained open not only to internationalism but very especially to non-Catalan, centralist demagogues, who quite consciously lured them away from any serious programme of local reforms and spurred them into violence (as was epitomised by the notorious activities of Alejandro Lerroux and his 'young barbarians' before the First World War). The most advanced middle class-based programme of reforms, impressive as it was in educational, administrative and cultural terms, hardly reached the urban working classes: this was the *Mancomunitat*, a confederation of the four official provinces from the Catalan Principality. It was first inspired and presided over by Prat de la Riba, and only lasted from 1914-1925. The *Mancomunitat* gave rural Catalonia, however, a feeling that public institutions were not necessarily inimical to their interests and that the rift between the industrial town and the countryside could be healed within a new, more acceptable, political framework, one represented by a united Catalonia itself. Its powers were too limited, though, even to begin to solve the problems that still beset the rural world. Even so, these, after a period of serious crises in the late 19th century, (especially in the wine-growing areas), were becoming less grave in the early 20th century and could not compare with the massive agricultural confrontation which was building up further south in Andalusia.

III

A BROKEN PROGRESS

The repercussions of the Great War in Catalonia could hardly be exaggerated: the rhythm of industrialisation grew enormously, backed by large sales of goods in Spain and overseas, only to be followed, after 1918, by a serious slump. The latter, however, did not wholly truncate the new expansive wave. Given the general 'backwardness' of the rest of Spain - with the exception of the now rapidly rising Basque country - Catalonia was becoming both the main pivot of the Spanish economy and the chief worry of its rulers.

The working classes continued to expand. Although migration from the Catalan countryside into the cities continued, the annual average of about 4,000 people coming from the rest of Spain into Catalonia rose to about 20,000 per year in the decade 1910-1920, a figure which would later look very small. (The first waves of immigrants tended to be Aragonese, a people who have always proved remarkably prone to assimilation into the life and language of their Catalan neighbours. A second wave, spearheaded by navvies who found work in the Barcelona underground railway, and who came mainly from the south-eastern region of Murcia, would follow later. Later still, during the economic expansion years under the Francoist regime, Andalusians would form the main bulk of immigration.) During the period 1917-1936 a thoroughly Catalan working class, skilled and unskilled, continued to exist, but it was rapidly changing. Thus, an 'aristocracy' of highly qualified workers was forming which was often linked to the *menestralia*. For their part, the professional middle classes, equally akin to this ubiquitous interstitial class, were attempting, once more, to re-establish some bridges with the workers. Thus, when an important alliance between the anarchist and the socialist unions was achieved in 1916, the opposition radical republican parties began to back workers' demands for better pay and conditions. Among the representatives of these progressive middle-classes were people like Francesc Layret, a distinguished labour lawyer, who tried to instil some sense into the courts and paid for it with his life, and Lluís Companys, who was to become, in 1933, President of the re-established autonomous government of Catalonia, the Generalitat.

Spain was not excluded from the many uprisings and confrontations that shook Europe in the aftermath of the First World War. There, however, a swift and efficient reaction by the army in 1917 gave the monarchy and the oligarchical parties in power a new lease of life. It also gave the army itself a noticeably more intense desire to participate in power as a right-wing force and a belief that it could control events successfully. Further crises led to a coup by the Captain General of Catalonia, Miguel Primo de Rivera, who toppled the constitutional government and rescued the monarchy. His dictatorship was sufficiently mild and traditional in style to allow the right-wing patrician Catalanists (more accurately, regionalists) to make the very last attempt, in the history of Spain, to 'Catalanise' the state. Their able leader was Francesc Cambó and their party was the *Lliga* (League) a Tory-like political formation, which had opted for Catalan regionalism and had achieved remarkable electoral successes and a clear hegemony over Catalan politics on the similarly Tory criteria of efficient leadership, conservatism and upper-class respectability. Cambó's efforts after 1923, were directed towards the creation of a state-wide 'constitutionalist' party which would obtain a working majority in the Spanish Cortes, and then begin to rule in a fully modern way. He had got almost there when, in 1931, the Monarch fell and the Second Republic was proclaimed. Its politics would be dominated, to a large extent, by new 'mass parties'. These drove out the old parties of notables and oligarchs, as well as those, like the *Lliga*, which were too narrowly linked to the interests of high finance.

The Republic released a number of pent-up forces which had been contained by a long succession of reactionary governments, culminating in Primo's increasingly less mild and more pro-fascist dictatorship. As the economic development achieved under his rule - in electrification, iron and steel production, road building - had not been accompanied by any economic structural reforms, the republicans who came after him were faced by increased social pressure. These came from the landless proletariat of southern *latifundia* areas, the rising expectations of the Asturian coal miners in the north, the lack of support (when not overt hostility) of the vast and forever growing anarchist unions, the naive conduct of their own supporting intellectuals, the world economic crises, the rising tide of fascism at home and abroad, and, last but not least, their own principled constitutionalism. It was the last that forced the first republican government to deal with issues which were literally matters of life or death for the

young democracy, such as the necessary agrarian reform, with legalistic parsimony, allowing later conservative (nominally republican) governments to boycott them successfully. The same constitutionalism permitted the crushing of defiant strikers in the northern coalmines by one of the Republic's generals, Francisco Franco, at the head of Foreign Legion troops in 1934. The odds against democracy were therefore immense, and one never ceases to wonder at the heroic and fierce resistance put up by the Spanish people for three years, after 1936, against fascism, despotic class rule and reactionary obscurantism, all the more when it is realised that the republican forces were far from united throughout the conflagration. This is hardly the place to dwell on this bit of Spanish history, one of the few about which the world at large - so profoundly affected by it at the time - seems to be relatively well informed. I shall accordingly confine myself to some observations about Catalonia in the context of Republic, Civil War, and reactionary dictatorship.

The place of Catalan society within that well-known Spanish tragedy was highly complex. In the first place, as observers have pointed out, Catalonia was the only thoroughly republican area of Spain, the only area, that is, where parliamentary democracy was well-grounded and legitimised in the popular culture, where it was not regarded with suspicion nor used opportunistically by a substantial part of the political classes. In other parts of Spain the cleavage between real republicanism (institutionalised political tolerance, active popular acceptance of constitutional authority and rule) and the opposite political beliefs was more serious: there the Republic had to face less a crisis of legitimacy than a lack of it.

Things were more complicated than this, however. If we speak of a 'thoroughly' republican Catalonia we are automatically assuming the incorporation of the anarchists into the general body politic. Yet, if this incorporation took place at all it was under a very special set of circumstances. In principle, as I have pointed out, Catalan libertarians, like their brethren in Valencia, Andalusia and elsewhere were convinced that the state, no matter what its form, was the enemy, and therefore abstained from voting for any party. By the time they rushed to the defence of democratic state institutions in 1936, the antidemocratic uprising was in full swing. They saved the day locally, and hastily formed a front along the Aragonese border, in the manner supremely described in George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*, but their initial mistake was irreparable. Yet some qualifications must be made which are relevant for my analysis.

Before the war broke out, Catalan anarchism, inspired by the very 'direct action' of earlier leaders such as the Noi del Sucre and Angel Pestaña (the latter, incidentally, an immigrant from León), had been rapidly evolving towards anarcho-syndicalism. Its spirit differed entirely from that of the new revolutionary squads intent on violent revolution: the FAI, or Iberian Anarchist Federation. Anarcho-syndicalism was becoming as open to collective bargaining practices with the employers as it continued to be thoroughly committed to the basic ideals of workers' self-management and the consolidation of the alternative culture which I have mentioned earlier. A typically Catalan, nearly pactist, lay, somewhat romantic, and yet profoundly practical conception of politics was finally beginning to take root among the anarchist workers of the country. During the years of the Republic, if not earlier, it began to diverge substantially from its more millenarian southern counterpart. (Incidentally, Communism was making some headway in the midst of the Andalusian strongholds of libertarianism, perhaps precisely because of its organisational and millenarian weaknesses.) Thus, the formation of a revolutionary, yet realistic, alternative political culture from below was well under way in Catalonia. The proof that this was so emerged in the capacity shown by the anarchists not only to fight but also to construct and maintain, most remarkably, the Catalan industrial complex for a long period: they manned the factories and ran the war industries and the services. In the end they were crushed, however, between Fascism and Stalinism, between the pre-eminently Socialist central Republican government and the strains of international isolation, lack of military support and their own naive strategies. Among the latter was the notion that, while the war was raging, revolution (collectivisation of properties) had to take place. This of course contrasted radically with the politics of the PSUC, the Catalan Communist Party, founded in 1936, initially a very small political formation, that grew considerably during the war. The communists supported the ownership of private property, small business, law and order, and a hierarchic, well disciplined, 'popular army' at the unswerving service of the Republican government.

It could be argued that these Communist policies were in their way as necessary for the survival of parliamentary democracy as they were typical of the country. Thus to this day, the PSUC possesses the same characteristics of caution, prudence and diffidence under a veneer of romantic Catalan patriotism. (It was a 'sovereign' party, though later it became the semi-

autonomous Catalan branch of the Spanish Communist Party.) That guaranteed it much support among an array of different people: civil servants, employees, shopkeepers, shop-stewards, engineers, bourgeois intellectuals who were fully committed to the Catalan national ideal of living *tocant de peus a terra*, that is, realistically, 'with one's feet firmly on the ground'.

The same commonsensical ideal seemed to permeate the vast middle class ranks of the hegemonic political force of the times, in the shape of the radical, strongly nationalist, liberal party, the Catalan Left or *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*. Its critics derided the aim of its leader Francesc Macià, which was to give every citizen 'a small house and a vegetable garden' (*la caseta i l'hortet*) which he could call his own and look after. Yet this seemingly pedestrian ideal struck a vital chord in the electorate. For it was this electorate - which comprised large sections of the rural *pagesia* and many workers - that allowed the triumph of middle class reformism within the framework of the re-established Generalitat, after more than two centuries of interruption. The *Esquerra's* achievements, however, were essentially confined to internal public administration, and looked very much like a continuation of the memorable work of the Mancomunitat. They included linguistic reform, great educational improvements, the creation of a thriving autonomous University, administrative efficiency, the first developments in welfare-state policies and many other tasks. Typically, for a people who had lost all traditions of statesmanship, these considerable achievements were, unfortunately, not matched by an equal skill in other, extremely delicate fields, such as relations with the central government and the policies towards the working class unions. In these areas their mistakes were very serious indeed.

For a start, a fully Federal Iberian Republic had been hastily and unilaterally proclaimed by Macià in 1931, from the balcony of the Generalitat Palace. Spain was in any case 'going republican', but in the event the Second Republic was not really federal, though it allowed for the formation of certain autonomous regions within the framework of the Constitution. Moreover, there were powerful antifederal forces throughout its political spectrum. Catalonia was granted its Statute of Autonomy in 1932, once a referendum had overwhelmingly endorsed it. (The Basques obtained their autonomy only at the onset of the Civil War.) Looked at retrospectively, the 1932 Statute clearly gave the Catalans considerable powers of self-government. They ranged from the setting up of a constitutional High Court

(*Tribunal de Cassació*) to the control of their own police force. The *Esquerra* emerged, within this new framework, as the decisive political force, having won great electoral victories both in the 1931 elections to the Spanish Cortes and in the 1932 poll for the Catalan Parliament. It pushed the right-wing *Lliga* on to the defensive. On its left, though, it had a great political void. This void had been created by the 'apolitical anarchists' and by the absence of any substantial socialist or communist party. (In other parts of Spain the Socialist Workers party, the PSOE, was the great majority party on the left it has always been.) Yet, instead of trying to bridge the gap with the working classes, incorporating them into the polity and the general civil society of the nation, the *Esquerra* leaders continued to harrass the anarchists, as if, under the critical circumstances of the times, such policies could be afforded. More precisely, what happened is that certain extreme, small (and in some significant cases, quasi-feudal) splinter *Esquerra* groups were allowed to control the Generalitat's police and persecute the anarchists. In this they were indirectly helped by the policies of the socialist ministers in the central government. In their efforts to thwart anarchism and help their party's own trade-union federation, the UGT, they created labour arbitration tribunals in which the government was represented; this, of course, was anathema to the anarchists. The Madrid government was thereby dangerously alienating the vast libertarian movements of several regions and, unconsciously, adding to the general level of conflict and confrontation in a society which was rapidly becoming split in too many ways. Neither the increasingly more grave international situation in the thirties nor the legacy of incessant misunderstandings and clashes between 'parliamentarians' and 'extra-parliamentarians' can possibly excuse the serious errors of the Catalan politicians during those fateful years. The middle-class radicals who were in power in Catalonia were unnecessarily provocative, as if unaware of the true proportions and strength of their constituency within the larger framework of Spain. They failed to realise that the endemic asynchrony (*desfasament*) between political developments and ideologies in Catalonia and those in the rest of Spain had to be played down and kept under control at moments of crisis, rather than used as a threat against other, ultimately stronger, forces. Accordingly, the far more 'advanced' and progressive political composition of Catalonia was seen as a deadly menace by the ever powerful reactionary forces who were by now conspiring to overthrow democracy by any means at their disposal. The farcical events of October 1934, when serious irregularities in the central government made it hypothetically illegal, and President Companys

proclaimed a 'Catalan State, within the Federal Spanish Republic', were the culmination of these misconceptions. Even centralist 'Jacobin' republicans of all sorts in Spain, who had given the Catalans the benefit of the doubt, became convinced that their traditional suspicions against Catalan 'separatism' had then been confirmed. (The ease with which the Catalan 'revolt' was suppressed glaringly contrasted with the fierce resistance put up by the Asturian coal miners at the same time, after they too had rebelled against the 'illegal' central government and the army had been sent against them.) Not surprisingly, when the army and its reactionary allies rose against the Republic two years later, one of their chief obsessions was the final eradication of what they saw as the worst possible threat to 'the sacred unity of the Spanish nation', Catalan and Basque separatism. The fact that real separatism - then as now - was not seriously contemplated by any substantial or minimally influential section of the Catalan population would matter precious little.

The antidemocratic uprising took place in July 1936. Having smashed it after considerable fighting in Barcelona, the anarchist leaders put their forces at the service of the Generalitat. This was indeed an historical decision in the annals of the libertarian movement, which heralded their actual entry into both the Catalan and the Republican cabinets. Its importance meant the end of the endemic hostility which existed between the by far most important workers' organisation and the authorities. Although it came too late to ultimately save democracy, and was to be followed by serious in-fighting between parties and factions during the war, the alliance was a turning point of lasting consequence. From then on, the working classes and left-wing parties of Catalonia - native born and immigrant alike - threw in their lot with the basic ideals of Catalanism, which after all included, as well as the desire for some form of autonomy and democratic political representation, a tendency towards a progressive or socially enlightened government. (This became clear finally, when the upper bourgeoisie of the country, most of them *Lliga* supporters, fled to the 'fascist' camp and ceased forever to harbour any more 'regionalist' daydreams.) Whether this momentous alliance might have lasted only for a period - the three years of the war - had the outcome been different is a moot point. What did happen was that the Franco dictatorship, by simultaneously prosecuting any form of Catalanism and all manifestations of working class assertiveness, from strikes to free trade unions, helped to consolidate the alliance. This much Catalonia owes the general.

While the Basques had to fight their part in the Civil War in complete geographical isolation from the rest of the Republican-held territories, and did so very much in an 'independentist' mood, Catalonia was in their middle. Perhaps this initial geopolitical situation was a decisive historical factor in determining the manner in which each minority nation later developed its respective democratic, anti-Francoist movement while the dictatorship lasted. Be that as it may, the fact is that Catalan forces came immediately to the rescue of the Republic outside Catalonia. The Aragonese front was formed, followed by offensives there. Arms were sent wherever they were required; abundant reinforcements and men were despatched to any front, including the besieged state capital. None of the major operations of the war, not even those fought on Catalan soil, ever took a separatist slant - the crossing and battle of the Ebro, for instance. (Yet the Generalitat was forced to add to its faculties an 'unconstitutional' *Conselleria de defensa*, or ministry of war, given the difficulties in the Republican camp.) In fact, the most dramatic, and ultimately self-defeating struggles within Republican Spain, including in-fighting in Catalonia, were far more related to ideological strife, power struggles and international entanglements than to the 'Catalan question' itself.

In spite of the long succession of crises and confrontations, the final balance of the years 1914-1936 in Catalonia was impressively positive. In a series of substantial ways Spain as a whole was moving in the right direction, first by recovering that place in European culture it had once lost, and then by peacefully acquiring a democratic constitution. Within this general process Catalonia began to govern herself again, first through the *Mancomunitat* and later through the restored *Generalitat*. Middle class parties with a modern mass following had been established. Articulate political agrarian organisations among a literate and highly enterprising *pagesia* had sprung up. Left-wing socialist parties - communist, social democratic, quasi-trotskyist - were finally developing and therefore posing a real threat to the until then massive 'extraparliamentary' forces. Further industrialisation, including new types of manufacture such as the famous Hispano-Suiza motorcar factory and the introduction of modern farming methods continued unabated. Educational research and pedagogic experimentation were thriving, both privately and publicly. In the wake of earlier linguistic reforms, culminating in the lexicographic and grammatical work of Pompeu Fabra, the full normalisation of the written and spoken language was finally achieved. Meanwhile serious work was

being done in archaeology, philology, classical studies, medicine, biology, astronomy, art history and restoration. These were often supported by private patrician foundations (*Fundació Bernat Metge*, sponsored by Cambó; *Fundació Patxot*.) Other private bodies (such as the modest but effective *Fundació Roca Gales*) were active in no less important fields, such as that of the co-operative movement. The most prestigious among these organisations was the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, that unofficial 'Catalan Academy of the Sciences', founded in 1907, and destined to become later, under the Franco regime, a living, though totally banned, symbol of the stubborn qualities of Catalan culture. In a word, the progress toward normalisation and recovery made over a few decades in nearly every field was quite impressive.

If such a specifically Catalan recovery possessed an 'international' dimension from the start - as the art of Joan Miró, the architecture of Josep Lluís Sert, or the work of so many scientists immediately suggest - it was also profoundly linked to the more general Spanish renaissance of the period. Thus, two of the founders of the musical reawakening of Spain, Enric Granados and Isaac Albèñiz, were Catalans; the Andalusian Picasso grew up in Barcelona and learned his trade at its Fine Art School, later giving his adopted city a museum with many of his works; Salvador Dalí was intimately involved with Luis Buñuel, the Aragonese film director, in the creation of Spanish surrealism; Catalan poets like Joan Maragall engaged in intense correspondence with non-Catalan intellectuals, such as Unamuno, in a strenuous effort to establish all-Spanish concord and understanding. Yet a haphazard list of well-known names can only be vaguely indicative of much deeper and greater currents at work, a few of which I have also just mentioned. Their sudden and violent obliteration, in 1939, compounded the enormity of the tragedy that befell Catalonia, along with the rest of Spain, when the Civil War was finally lost, in 1939.

The Franco regime came to power in order to put an end to real or imagined revolution. It was essentially, throughout its history, the praetorian dictatorship of a reactionary coalition formed by several bourgeois forces: southern land-owners; rural, traditionalistic middle classes; the high Church; the financial and industrial upper bourgeoisie of all Spain; and several other conservative groups and strata. It operated with the help of certain 'service classes' such as the secret police, the Civil Guard, and a vast army of loyal civil servants. For a long time, it used the services of a fascist party, the Falange, to which it entrusted the control of fake trade-

unions. Later, it sought the help of an allegedly apolitical semi-secret Catholic organisation, Opus Dei, for more delicate matters of state and economic policy. Being, in the last analysis, a class dictatorship of the traditional kind, what Francosim as a political system sought from the people at large was not fascist-like mobilisation, but passive obedience, apoliticism, and 'law and order'.

Under such circumstances, the impact of the war and of the terrifying aftermath of exile, endless executions, and political imprisonments could not affect the class structures of Spain very much, save in the sense that change towards a more equal society had been fully arrested. The attempt was to 'freeze' politically an inherited social order that was deemed good, and even, in some significant ways, to reverse certain trends. (Thus at one stage futile attempts were made to keep the peasants tied to the land, the alleged source of all moral virtues, and to stop them migrating to the cities.) All this, however, contradicted some of the objectives the regime had set itself; national aggrandisement, forced industrialisation, even imperialism. The contradictions soon became evident to the very leaders of the regime, who then simply concentrated on achieving a transformation 'from above' which would leave the power, prestige or possessions of the ruling classes intact while their conservative objectives were attained. It was thus that certain important decisions for the economic and class structure of Spain were successively taken. One of them was the development of a National Industrial Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Industria*, or INI), which was to become an industrial giant, not unlike its Italian counterpart, and also originally fascist-inspired. Essentially the INI was a means for forced capital accumulation and industrialisation in a country where the capitalist class was too shy and unwilling to invest. Another was to accommodate to the western economic system. This entailed allowing and encouraging labour migrations to the prosperous countries north of the Pyrenees and to to into the tourist trade on a mass basis. It meant, also, the liberalisation of the Spanish economy, which began to open up to foreign investors and to full participation in the international capitalist division of labour. This last decision, taken in 1959, triggered a slow process of integration into the western economy which is still under way. It will eventually culminate with Spain's entry into the European Common Market.

Most of these major policy decisions of the successive Franco cabinets look more like successful efforts to swim with the tide than like components

of any distinct and coherent economic strategy. In the last analysis, their effect on society as a whole may not have been as great as the simple continuation of already existing trends in the demography, the economy, the class relationships, and the culture of Spain. These were already clearly at work in the decades preceding the war and came back into their own once its immediate repercussions were over.

IV

THE STRUCTURE AND CHANGE OF CATALAN SOCIETY: 1939-80

By the time Spain acquired, once more, a democratic parliamentary constitution (1976-1978) its society had changed in many important ways. For a western European society Spain had been backward and semiperipheral, possessing only a few industrialised enclaves, and with very low indices of literacy, education, urbanisation and per capita income. Yet, by the late 70's it had been transformed into a modern industrial society in nearly every way including, significantly, certain ideological, religious and other cultural characteristics which appear to be typical of modernity in the West. The ultimate political failure of the long-lasting Franco dictatorship was therefore complete: the Spain that arose after its final collapse was a far cry from that which its founder had meant to perpetuate.

The transformations which took place during the Franco era affected Catalonia as much as any other part of Spain, if not more in certain specific areas. I shall analyse some of them now, emphasising the basic trends which affected the social structure of Catalonia before it entered into a new democratic period in its troubled history, when more than a simple measure of home rule and democracy was again gained by its people. Formally, this began to occur when the exiled Catalan president, Josep Tarradellas, came back to take possession of a provisional Generalitat, in 1977. The transitional period to constitutionalism culminated in March 1980, when a Catalan Parliament within the Spanish state was elected. The transfer of powers from the central to the autonomous government continued its slow and uneven progress over the next years.

(a) *Population trends, urbanisation, and the social geography of Catalonia.* By the 18th century onwards the demographic weight in the Iberian Peninsula had shifted to the periphery. The central peninsular areas - Castile, eastern Portugal, Aragón - became quite thinly populated. Real 'demographic deserts' began to appear in their midst, in contrast with the coastal regions. This process underwent further acceleration in the 19th and 20th centuries with the important exception of the politically generated growth of Madrid and, later, after the 1950's, the appearance of some other large inland cities, such as Valladolid and Saragossa. In Catalonia, peripheral position and industrialisation combined, with quite spectacular results. Throughout the period, the vegetative growth of the native population was due more to a higher standard of living, lower rates of mortality and other similar factors than to the fertility rates themselves. These were, until very recently, notoriously low in Catalonia. (In fact, the Catalan people's reluctance to raise large families had been recognised by some observers as an indication of the modernity of their mentality. The specific effects of this attitude upon the psychological socialisation of children, fostering individualism, and the economic effects upon the concentration and transmission of wealth in certain European societies are relatively well known.) Massive growth, therefore, has mainly been due to immigration, rather than to the vegetative trends of the natives.

By 1975 Catalonia had over 5.5 million inhabitants, while Spain as a whole had 35 million people. In the former, the population had grown 37.15% over the 1960 figures by 1972, in contrast with the overall figure for Spain, which was 12.47%. By this later date, however, this enormous growth rate had begun to diminish while other trends appeared: the birth rate all over Spain began to rise less steeply, while Catalan native birth rates, after their notorious and prolonged stagnation, began to rise. Immigration into Catalonia decreased, first because it was rechannelled towards other European countries and, later, when this came to a halt, because the general rural exodus itself showed signs of drying up. The world economic recession of the mid and late 70's plunged Catalonia into especially high levels of unemployment, and ceased to make it attractive to would-be immigrants. Yet, by then the demographic, political and linguistic map of the country had changed very substantially. The vast consequences of these migratory trends upon the class structure of Catalonia will receive some attention in the following paragraphs.

The geographical distribution of the Catalan population after 1939 followed the patterns laid down earlier by the industrial revolution. First and foremost, both non-Catalan immigrants and rural Catalans moving into the urban areas continued to crowd the metropolitan area of Barcelona, as well as the coastal economic and demographic axis, including, north to south, the cities of Figueres, Girona, Mataró, Vilafranca, Vilanova, Reus and Tortosa. In the interior, the provincial capital of Lleida also grew, though some 'counties' (*comarques*) in its provincial administrative area were to suffer the worst depopulation. Another axis, equally important, runs along the Llobregat river. From the beginning of industrialisation the stream has been dotted, all along its course, with factories and manufacturing villages and towns. The city of Manresa, situated on one of its affluents, is the most important of the Llobregat valley industrial centres apart from those, in the Barcelona metropolitan area, which stand on its delta.

Well over half the population of Catalonia now dwell within the Barcelona conurbation. The Municipality itself, hemmed in on all sides by large towns and cities had, by 1970, 1,745,142 inhabitants. One of its contiguous cities (served by the same underground network, telephone area, and being, in every sense, a suburb of the central urban zone) is L'Hospitalet, which had, by then, 241,978 inhabitants. Other cities ringing Barcelona are Badalona, with a population in 1970 of 162,888; Sabadell, with 159,408; Terrassa, with 138,697; Santa Coloma, with 106,711. Not including other various suburbs, such as those in the Baix Llobregat area, with very sizeable towns and sprawling neighbourhoods, the total population of these municipalities was of over 2.5 million people. The following table gives an idea of the phenomenal speed with which population growth occurred within approximately a maximum of 30 miles of the capital in the 50's and 60's:

Changes in population within Greater Barcelona

	1857	1950	1970
Barcelona (municipality)	234,739	1,280,179	1,745,142
10 Km circle around Barcelona	40,749	257,644	962,316
10 to 20 Km circle	59,259	143,261	391,916
30 to 40 Km circle	47,035	60,722	87,741
40 to 50 Km circle	53,319	71,200	105,767

By 1970 the Barcelona municipality itself was reaching saturation for, five years later, in 1975, it had only risen to just over 1,751,000 inhabitants, a figure that remained stable into the 80's. The spillover effect into the other towns of the conurbation continued for a while. Thus, by 1981 L'Hospitalet had nearly 300,000 inhabitants, Badalona well over 200,000, while Sabadell was nearing this latter figure. However, in the same decade the rate of urban growth was finally abating. Most of it had been due both to internal migrations and outside immigrants. The first, for the most part, managed to settle in the already existing built-up areas or in new, relatively good-quality housing, by virtue of family connection or their higher economic position. The majority of immigrants, though, most of them non-Catalan labourers, came in an unplanned stream one of the immediate effects of which was the formation of two new large categories of habitation, apart from those which were already there. (Among the latter were the areas of long-standing settlement, including a large mosaic of urban habitats, from the ancient urban and village nuclei to the well-planned zones of the already mentioned Victorian *Eixample* of the Barcelonese middle classes.) In the first place there were the many quarters of hurriedly and cheaply build 'social dwellings', created to remedy the evils of the hovel townships in which the new arrivals lived. These new quarters were makeshift suburbs of often high-rise tenement buildings, erected with no consideration to landscape, hygiene, availability of services or minimal architectural elegance. In the second place there was the mass of *barraques* or shacks built almost overnight with ramshackle materials by the incoming peasants from the south. The Franco regime, which presided over this large-scale urban blight, allowed for the institutionalisation of municipal corruption and the active protection of land speculation in a manner which has been fully documented in published material, without denial by the beneficiaries. (The same regime of course shelved and ignored such efforts as the 1932 Macià Plan for the harmonious development of Greater Barcelona, as well as those put forward by the notable *Grup d'Arquitectura Contemporània*, the GATCPAC, from 1929 onwards.) Though parallel urban disasters and dislocations have happened in more democratic contexts, as witness the Milanese immigrant suburbs or the Parisian *bindonvilles* of almost the same years, there is sufficient evidence to show that a causal relationship existed in the Spanish case between the regime and the incalculable damage caused to the Catalan habitat. This damage includes the considerable destruction of one of the most beautiful areas in the entire Mediterranean, the rugged shores of Catalonia, the Costa Brava.

These patterns of urban growth and deterioration, which were certainly not restricted to Catalonia in the decades after 1940, were soon extended to urban centres other than Barcelona, such as the provincial capitals of Girona and Tarragona. What is remarkable, however, is that neither this, nor the improvements in communication - especially the motorways, one along the entire coast, the other jutting into Aragón and beyond - seem to have entirely broken the back of the 'natural' regional unit of Catalan society, the unofficial county or *comarca*. The Republican Generalitat abolished the four absurdly artificial provinces and re-established the *comarca* as the administrative unit, though this was later abolished, and the *comarcal map* became a symbol of subversion and 'Catalanism' wherever exhibited. (It was, in fact, prohibited.) The vitality of the *comarca*, however, has important, non-ideological roots, which perhaps go even deeper than the traditional Mediterranean attachment to locality. Catalonia encompasses in its smallness (it is a country of Holland's size) an amazing geographical variety, extending from the high peaks of the Pyrenees to the olive groves of the coastal plains. This variety often occurs within its own regions, such as that formed by the northern counties of the Conflent, Roussillon, Cerdanya and Capcir. It is largely due to a sharp orographical fragmentation into relatively self-contained valleys, plateaux, and the coastal strips, which are separated from the interior by a long mountain chain. Through history, each *comarca* has developed around its central market-town and maintained architectural, economic and social characteristics of its own. There is nothing unique about this, save that a canton-like political organisation such as Switzerland's was made impossible by historical events. Yet the geographical infrastructure for an administrative and political solution of that nature seems to be still there. Be that as it may, what I want to stress is that, the Barcelona conurbation notwithstanding, Catalonia still retains a good measure of equilibrium between town and country. More than that, there continues to be a good number of thriving small *comarca* capitals, bound to their prosperous hinterland and with lives of their own, trying to assert their independence from the main administrative centres.

Lest all this gives an excessively idyllic view of the situation - which it could not, given my remarks on disorderly urban growth - it must be pointed out that even in a country as small and prosperous as Catalonia certain areas of serious depopulation and rural poverty have been developing in the midst of economic development. The *Catalunya pobla*, or 'poor Catalonia' of the high mountain areas and other interior *comarques* first

became economically depressed with the intense internal migrations of the 60's and 70's, though some stabilisation was then reached. Trends have been reversed in some cases, but the new developments (ski stations, tourism, village houses and mountain cottages owned by well-to-do townspeople) are linked to patterns of land speculation, owner absenteeism and others which pose problems as serious as they are familiar in other contexts.

(b) *Labour migrations and the class structure of contemporary Catalonia.* The most important single factor affecting the class and political features of Catalonia as it began to emerge from the long Francoist period after 1975, was the massive influx of immigrants which had occurred in the preceding decades. This was so not only because of the sheer volume of the peaceful 'invasion' but also because of the specific cultural conditions in which it occurred. In former times the capitalist 'pull' of Catalonia had combined with the poverty 'push' of the places of origin of the work-seeking migrants. From 1939 onwards, political considerations also came into play, especially in the first years of the Francoist peace, when disappointment, defeat and political persecution heightened the oppressive atmosphere of much of rural Spain, which then sank into the appalling poverty of the 1940's. Anonymity and the perennial attractions of the 'city lights' for the peasant combined with the higher salaries and the 'abundance' of employment to be found in Barcelona and its nearby towns, as well as in Bilbao and, for political reasons, in Madrid as well. It was a long time before the saturation of the labour market and the employment needs of an expansive European economy north of the Pyrenees began to ease the pressure on Catalonia as a host society by redirecting Spanish labour migration further afield. Traditional overseas migrations had also been declining considerably by then due to changes in the Latin American economies. By the time this happened, however, Catalonia had received already an immigrant population equivalent to nearly one third of its original native population. In the 1960-1971 period alone 665,731 people, mostly Andalusians, Extremadurians and Murcians (i.e. Southerners) had come to settle there. Their spatial concentration meant that around 1975 nearly half the Barcelona municipality was of non-Catalan stock (49%) whereas in its own province (the capital excluded) it was above 46%. This uneven distribution also meant that entire neighbourhoods and suburbs sprung up which were ethnically and culturally Andalusian. Some of them, as for instance Cornellà, a Barcelona suburb, are quite large. Smaller

immigrant enclaves were to be found in nearly all industrial towns. Settlement has even occurred in some poor rural areas, where the *masovers* (tenant family) of the remote *masia* may now sometimes be immigrant peasants.

The political consequences of these changes became quite clear when two representatives of the Andalusian Socialist Party managed to get elected to the Catalan Parliament in 1980, even though the vast majority of immigrants voted for the Catalan Socialist or Communist Parties, both federated with their Spanish counterparts. Supposedly, this result strengthened their respective leaderships' belief that firm ties with the all-Spanish parties is now necessary in order to retain the immigrant vote. Things, however, were not that simple: some gains by the old liberal *Esquerra*, whose near collapse everyone had predicted, and the triumph of Catalan nationalist moderate conservatives, the Convergence Party led by Jordi Pujol, also showed the unremitting strength of nationalist feelings throughout a wide spectrum of voters in 1980.

Besides these considerations, and linked with them, was the question of the new patterns of social inequality to which massive immigration had given rise. At first, the peasant-turned-industrial worker expanded the ranks of the local unskilled proletariat. As immigrants grew massively in numbers and became settled (and often skilled) industrial workers there arose a Spanish-speaking, easily recognisable, large 'minority' of non-Catalans with their families, now forming a conspicuous feature of the class system. (To illustrate this, and as a matter of curiosity, a significant communist splinter movement in the late sixties, *Bandera Roja* - from which the Communist Party would later obtain some of its ablest leaders - engaged for a while in the exclusive use of the Spanish language explaining to all and sundry that Catalan was 'the language of the bourgeoisie', and therefore to be avoided.) The political-linguistic tensions generated by the new linguistic stratification are far from being unimportant in the dialectics of class inequality and political order in Catalonia, or indeed elsewhere in other parts of Spain.

Once certain 'manageable' immigration rates and volume have been left behind, cultural integration becomes difficult. In the case of Catalonia, under the Franco regime, cultural integration became very arduous. The reasons were manifold. Unlike their pre-war predecessors the immigrants living in large settlements with their *own paisanos* (local countrymen) often

became only dimly aware of the sort of society in whose midst they were living and raising their children, save perhaps in terms of class. School, newspapers, radio, television, advertisements, the official bureaucracy, everything was in Spanish. For immigrants Catalan was something one sometimes overhead in buses, streets and shops: a language from which others switched to Castilian when they were addressed. Under such conditions it is inevitable to wonder at the extent to which the Catalan language has actually been learnt after 1940 among so many immigrants rather than at the reverse phenomenon, the widespread lack of learning. These and other related phenomena - such as a certain *angst* about survival as a nation - must explain why sociolinguistics as a discipline has enjoyed such popularity among academics in all the Catalan countries: as a consequence we now possess a number of interesting studies shedding important light on this difficult terrain.

Whatever the future of the languages spoken nowadays in Catalonia it is clear that the superimposition of language patterns over those of class breeds social tension. In most societies some superimpositions and identifications are likely to be interpreted in antagonistic terms by certain groups. There is little doubt that in the past the often arrogant use of Spanish by non-native civil servants, policemen, judges and other public functionaries in Catalonia and the Basque country was particularly irritating to the natives, and represented to them this kind of hostile superimposition. It not only reinforced their already existing resentments against an alien and remote administration, but led a great many people among the local population to identify the state and the political regime with one particular linguistic and ethnic community.

Very roughly, in most recent times the situation has been this: the higher one went in the status, prestige and power social scale, the more frequently Catalan was likely to be the spoken language. (At the highest peak of the Catalan bourgeoisie, however, one would again 'hear' Spanish, especially from the 40's to the 60's, as a consequence of the new-found political allegiances of this stratum.) The immigrant population would come into contact with Catalan-speaking shop-stewards, engineers, managers and, occasionally, professionals: doctors or lawyers - always one or several social rungs above them. This, apart from a natural desire to participate fully in the society, may explain the frequent desire expressed by the immigrants to have their children taught Catalan at schools. Thus, answering questionnaires and interviews, the invariable reason given for this is that

they want their children to learn the language because 'it is necessary to get on in life'. Until now, by contrast, the same desire has never been expressed with equal force by those native-speaking Spanish middle class civil servants - including the military - who are more or less permanently posted in Catalonia.

By comparison with other culturally mixed areas, the degree of social prejudice must be remarkably low in Catalonia, one of the least 'racist' societies in the world. This is not to say that prejudice and irrational resentment is non-existent or that its ugly head has never been raised; it is only to state that it has been kept under a great measure of control until now by all concerned in spite of the bitter legacy of Francoism, when Catalan culture and identity were frontally attacked by the government as a matter of policy. I shall have to return to some of these questions of inequality and conflict, after some necessary remarks are first made about the nature of recent economic growth in Catalonia.

(c) *Catalonia and the economic development of Spain.* The end of the Civil War did not bring with it the early recovery of Catalonia, nor, for that matter, any part of Spain. The external conditions created by the Second World War, unlike those of the First, were not favourable for a Spain itself devastated by war, impoverished, and not strictly neutral. Peace, in 1945, given the 'fascist' nature of the regime, did not herald any form of Marshall Plan either. As a consequence, Spain continued to languish in its poverty, while the rest of Western Europe received substantial amounts of American aid. It was thus that the economic aftermath of the Civil War lasted at least until 1953.

During those years, Catalan industrialists were in the fortunate position of having at their disposal an entirely domesticated work-force. Their now frozen and extremely low salaries were kept under complete control both by force and by virtue of the constant inflow of raw labour from the countryside. Violent accumulation of capital had some positive effects, of course, partly reflected in the considerable number of new companies set up over the period in Catalonia. The capital, however, tended to be much smaller than that of the new companies formed in Madrid and elsewhere: large private enterprise, when constituted, tended to be outside Catalonia, a tendency that announced future qualitative changes in the structure of the Spanish economy. For political reasons the Catalan entrepreneurs during the aftermath years encountered legal difficulties

of all sorts, while they were given great facilities to transfer their businesses' central offices to set up new ones outside their 'region'. Likewise, the fascist-inspired autarkic ideology soon prompted the regime to engage in the development of the already-mentioned state holding company, the INI, which eventually grew to be a giant, with interests all over Spain. Some of these were certainly in Catalonia, including the biggest car factory in Spain SEAT (originally built with the help of FIAT capital and under their license, later to become entirely independent of it), one hydroelectric company, the old Hispano-Suiza automobile and heavy lorry factory (now renamed Pegaso), and other substantial assets. Yet, though all these were, and still are, in Catalonia, their control ceased to be Catalan in the traditional sense.

Throughout the post-war period Catalan capitalist accumulation and expansion were more often than not linked to small and middling enterprises. The previous decline and crisis of Catalan banking - it had never been too strong, in contrast with the powerful Catalan savings banks, based on the thrifty habits of the natives - were one of the causes of this phenomenon, for substantial credit had now to be sought from the large Basque banks or the Madrid ones. The former had direct links with the heavy industry in their part of the world and the latter were much more helpful to local firms and certain ruling groups, with marked antipathies to the Catalans. This must have been one of the reasons why a substantial number of new important Catalan firms opened their head offices in Madrid in the period 1940-1953, ranging from aircraft and automobile firms to cement and chemicals, and including shipping and forestry, conveniently situated at well over 600km from the ports and the forests respectively, where they were going to operate. All this irrationality consolidated further the familistic structure of business enterprise in Catalonia and left the area quite unprepared for some of the important economic transformations that were to occur after 1959.

In that year, and in those to follow, the government took a number of skilful economic measures aimed at running down state economic intervention in the economy, controlled liberalisation and integration in the international capitalist economy. The unpalatable aspects of these decisions (a wage freeze, higher bank rates) were soon drowned in the two great strokes of luck enjoyed by Spain in the sixties: an ever-growing influx of foreign tourists and labour migrations to Europe. Both injected into the economy enormous amounts of badly needed foreign currency and

allowed the re-equipment of industry. Workers' remittances to their families strengthened the acquisitive power of areas hitherto quite unimportant as purchasing centres. Whilst tourism benefited regions which were not precisely poor, such as the Catalan Costa Brava itself, it had an incalculable impact on very poor ones, especially along the Andalusian coastline. The conjunction of these and other factors - further urbanisation, vast improvements in transport and telecommunications, the final development of a health and social services network, no matter how deficient - produced the Spanish transformation of the 60's and early 70's, when the economy grew for nearly a dozen years at rates second only to those of Japan. The average annual increase in gross domestic product was 6.9% in real terms between 1960 and 1975.

With the exceptions of very large industry pointed out above Catalonia participated fully in this general expansion. For one thing, its economy continued to diversify. While at the end of the period textiles continued to be mainly situated there, the country became far less dependent on them, as light engineering, electronics, the food industry, publishing, building, and quite a few other lines of activity were developed with remarkable success. For another, banking finally came into its own on a local basis. Several banks, spearheaded by the newly formed Banca Catalana, experienced a spectacular growth. They did so purposefully with Catalanist aims in mind, both economic and political, and though the latter could not be publicly expressed, the message did not get lost to the myriads of new account holders that flocked to them. Such banks were intended to provide local business with adequate financial backing. This policy, however, unexpectedly turned sour when the recession forced firms to stop their repayments on the generous loans obtained by the 'Catalanist' banks. In 1983 Banca Catalana was in crisis. It was taken over by a consortium formed by several large Spanish banks. Suggestions to turn it into the official bank of the Catalan Government or for it to be salvaged by the powerful local savings banks or even to have it nationalised by the state came to nought. The Socialist government in Madrid obviously preferred further concentration of economic power in the great banks to other possible courses of action. The same central government likewise, by putting the large Rumasa group of companies under receivership - a sound and courageous step - further weakened the position of still another Catalan bank - Banco Atlántico - which was part of that concern.

The Catalan economy in the 1980's was threatened, as were economies in other important European regions, by the energy crisis, unemployment, inflation and serious problems in some key industries, such as automobile manufacturing. Yet Catalonia possesses a high per capita income, nearly 30% higher than the Spanish average, and double that of the poorest regions, though similar to those of Madrid and the Basque country. Despite the scandalously low level of state expenditure and investment in the 'region' - one of the areas from which the central administration has systematically extracted more wealth ever since industrialisation began - many infrastructure conditions have improved very substantially, as witness the motorway network. With only 16% of the Spanish population Catalonia was generating 20% of the gross domestic product, 26% of Spain's industrial production and held 20% of all bank deposits. Industrial investment - as if to belie any fears of impending de-industrialisation - was injected into Catalonia at a 30% rate of the total Spanish investment in the sector. And, of Spain's 1,562 companies with annual sales of about \$4m., 440 were in Catalonia in 1980. There was one car for every four people, while figures for every other sign of modern affluence were equally high. Its active agrarian population, with a flourishing and well-marketed produce was, as in many other advanced societies, very small, a mere 6% of the total. The numbers of students in higher and further education equalled or surpassed, relative to population, those of many advanced modern countries including some in northern Europe.

Taken in isolation, these data are, however, quite misleading, for both the economic position of the country within Spain, and that of the latter in the international structure of capitalism has changed considerably and in some ways beyond recognition. In the first place, although Catalonia continues to possess a relatively distinct economic structure, and is still a fundamental component of the entire Spanish economy, it has ceased to be the central piece it once was. Its role and weight are still important indeed, but in the new economic structure of Spain, Catalonia is only one in a complex set of components. (Others are the industrial belt of Madrid, mainly based on large multinationals; the Asturian mines and metallurgical works; the Basque industrial area, which has spilled over to neighbouring, previously unindustrialised, Castilian provinces, such as Burgos; and the many important industries in places as different as Seville (aircraft), La Mancha (refineries), Cadiz (shipbuilding) not to speak of the vast agroindustries of the Canaries, Valencia and elsewhere.) No one

in his right mind ever rejoiced in the poverty of others, least of all Catalan businessmen, forever bedevilled by the low acquisitive power of the other Spaniards, but a contrast between 'external' poverty and local prosperity seems to have been one of the main apparent features of the Catalan *fet diferencial* for a very long time. As I have implicitly tried to show from the start, in my discussion of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, I do not think that the poverty/wealth territorial cleavage in itself means too much, and certainly not more than other modes of social structuration, i.e. the ways and patterns through which people enter into social intercourse with each other, as well as their political and moral values. Yet external observers and, indeed, also many people directly involved in this territorial cleavage in multi-ethnic countries or states - Belgium, Ireland, Spain - have often made much (too much) ideological hay of it. The removal of the worst excesses of the poverty/wealth contrast, as the rest of Spain grows more prosperous and some of its classes 'converge' with the Catalan ones - for instance the expanding new middle classes everywhere - must be therefore a welcome trend. From now on the *fet diferencial* will have to depend increasingly less on regional differentials of wealth and prosperity and more on far less invidious distinctions.

Economic development outside Catalonia, including multinational companies and foreign investments, have combined with a greater economic integration of the entire Spanish economy to make the Catalan economy viable only as a part of the whole market. Indeed, once the retrenchment of the 40's and 50's was over, branches of Catalan industry and commerce continued to multiply everywhere. Some of them crossed the state frontier into Trench' Catalonia with the specific intention of having a foothold in the Common Market. While this process was under way, however, foreign investments and multinational penetration came to complicate the picture. Competition from abroad became so fierce that a great many of the family enterprises - and quite a few of the more advanced, joint-stock ones - opted for selling their businesses to foreign firms. Likewise, multinationals very often had the initiative in the takeovers and mergers that took place in the 60's and 70's, thus diminishing the degree of autonomy in economic decision-making once enjoyed by the local traditional entrepreneurial class. There were, of course, limits to this trend, especially as a new, quite aggressive brand of Catalan business executive rose in that period - often linked to public and semi-public enterprise - quite explicitly critical of the shyness and 'defeatism' of his elders, and not entirely unsuccessful in his counter-attacks.

(d) *Some social complexities.* The social class structure of Catalonia, already far from simple in the past, steadily grew more intricate after 1940. It would be marvellous if one could sum it up acceptably pointing to a number of obvious contrasts and traits: to compare, for instance, the two rural Catalonias (the *nova* and the *vella*), the 'new' and the 'old', south and north of the Llobregat respectively, with distinct agricultural economies and kinship patterns. It is noteworthy that there is a traditional bourgeois society and a more advanced capitalist-corporatist one in the urban areas, with their specific social classes: the old genteel middle classes and an upper bourgeoisie on the one hand, and a new employee occupational stratum on the other. Certain occupations continue to be notoriously absent from the Catalan native population (policemen, certain kinds of state civil servants, military officers) with a 'void' thus being created in the local distribution of tasks. All these things are certainly true and relevant, but they are only part of the new picture.

The truth is that Catalan society has reached a critical point in which readjustment, rapid change, a cultural crisis and new patterns of power, inequality and privilege are emerging very quickly. Many of them are very obviously bound to current changes in the structures of many advanced societies, such as the rise of new 'executive' strata within large corporations (Catalan executives, by the way, are quite mobile internationally), the development of a large white collar population, and such like. Thus, while the strictly proletarian population of Catalonia grew to enormous proportions in the first two decades after the Civil War, internal differentiation within the working classes, the rapid rise of skilled labour and the equally rapid development of 'intermediate cadres' eventually changed the proportions and internal composition of the subordinate classes. The implications were obvious: the traditional 'united front' presented by the the working class against 'the rich' and the state is now being substantially undermined by struggles for the maintenance and improvement of salary differentials, just as anywhere else in the industrialised world. Likewise, despite the well-founded image that Catalan society contains myriads of small businessmen, enterprising self-employed individualists all, the country also has a percentage of an employed and salaried population which is extremely high. Taking 1950 as a base 100, by 1970 the employee, salaried population had risen to 140 as against 106 only for the rest of Spain. However, any data on occupations and employment must be approached sceptically: the unreported 'black

economy' for instance, is alive and thriving in Catalonia, as indeed it is in other similar regions of southern Europe.

Next to these trends there are others which have increased the mosaic-like aspect of the country: Barcelona has continued true to its cosmopolitan nature and continues to be inhabited by a great number of foreigners. Wild figures are given about the numbers of Latin American refugees (mostly middle class) that settled there after despotic regimes were installed in Chile, the Argentine and elsewhere, and they cannot be repeated here as they are unreliable, but they certainly form a conspicuous and lively part of the capital's human landscape. Very symptomatic of the level of development reached by the Spanish economy as a whole was the arrival of unskilled and underpaid Moroccan labourers - first to build the motorways, later lingering on to take jobs unwanted by the by now well-settled Southern migrants. They were later followed by illegal black African labourers who work mostly along the coast, north of Barcelona.

There are, in addition, new developments which pose interesting sociological questions. For instance, a 'second' generation of migrants or, more correctly, first generation Catalans, is coming of age. Unlike those who preceded them before the War, and I dare say in the first twenty-odd years after it, they are far from being culturally assimilated into the traditions and language of the host society. These 'new Catalans' will no doubt develop their own social ambitions and expectations. ('New Catalans' ought to be distinguished from their parents, the so-called 'other Catalans', *els altres catalans* as named in a famous best-seller by an immigrant worker turned writer, Francesc Candel, who became, like many of his fellow-immigrants, a good Catalan patriot.) They will translate their aspirations into political terms in the years to come, perhaps independently of the more established ideological streams, unless they are successfully incorporated into them. Much depends on the real powers and skills of the Generalitat in controlling education and the mass communications network as well as pursuing a truly democratic and tolerant policy towards all. At any rate, by the end of the century the percentage of 'new' or first generation Catalans within the entire population will be very great.

Finally, problems of class differentiation and conflict have begun to mesh with acute forms of social disorganisation, reflected in a steep rise in violent street crime, burglaries and assaults. The immediate reasons for this are not only the economic recession and the unemployment rates, but also

the scandalous deficiencies in the educational, health and leisure facilities, inherited from Francoism everywhere. (In other places, notably Madrid, the situation is equally bad.) The fact that the police and, so it seems, a great part of the magistrates' body, have been uncooperative with the new political order and seem to believe that crime and democracy go together, does not help solve the problem. Although Catalonia has remained fairly free so far from political terrorism and a violent independentist movement, a sense of fear and insecurity grew among the law abiding citizenry in the late 70's which satisfied only one small group of people: those who nostalgically wanted the impossible turning back of the clock to the 'good old days' of Francoist rule. For all these reasons - some political, some economic, and quite a few relating to the world of collective identifications and values - Catalonia approaches the end of the 20th century with some hopes, for it again has a good measure of democratic government, the kind of government that best suits its children, but it does so in the midst of intense change and considerable uncertainties.

In the concluding pages which follow I shall explore a little further these issues of class, privilege, power and community as they express themselves in the political life of contemporary Catalonia. This may prove useful if we wish to understand the main problems facing the country and its people today.

THE RECONQUEST OF DEMOCRACY

The Francoist forces invaded Catalonia practically as an army of occupation would. The territory was in fact, for a while, administered by a so-called Chief of the Occupation Forces and Services. Having fought a number of battles defensively, the Republican army in Catalonia crossed into France, where it was shamefully and inhumanly treated by a supposedly friendly and democratic French government. About one hundred thousand Catalans abandoned their land, among the half million from the whole of Spain. Some crossed over to the Americas, others stayed in Europe and soon joined the Resistance against the Nazis and, later, even tried to liberate their country in a heroic, if futile and quixotic attempt at a regular armed invasion through the valley of Aran, in the Pyrenees. (This was followed by guerrilla activity, mainly CNT anarchist inspired: the last guerrilla, the famous Quico Sabaté, was killed in Sant Celoni as late as 1962.) A serious attempt was made at the abolition by decree of the Catalan language: every national institution, from the Generalitat to the Institute of Catalan Studies, and of course schools, the Autonomous University, the Catalan language newspapers and radio were closed down. The slightest connection with the Republican order could mean at least some form of purge, deportation or geographical transfer. Thousands upon thousands, as in other parts of Spain, were executed just for having been socialists, or communists, freemasons, even simply liberals. The exiled President of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, was arrested by the Gestapo in France and turned over to the Francoists. He was executed in the Montjuïc fortress, after a fake trial. This kind of repression would continue, certainly not in as virulent a form, after 1945, though torture, arbitrary arrests and a number of executions continued to be a part of the normal life of the regime while it lasted.

Even more so than during the war, or in the tragic old days of *pistolisme*, this was the true time of *Catalonia infelix*, in the telling expression of one of the country's English friends. Its sufferings should not be odiously compared with those of other parts of Spain: there was, no doubt, more

hunger and despair in Andalusia or among the martyred population of Madrid, as there was even more suffering by that time in Poland, and soon, nearly everywhere in Europe and beyond. But one thing is clear, without which it seems impossible to understand the politics and stance of Catalans and Basques today; both their countries were occupied not only as part of a campaign against democracy and every form of socialism, tolerance and liberalism, but simply *as countries*, as ethnic identities. In this, the Franco regime was explicit in every way: it thus clarified ideological positions and, as I have pointed out before, was very helpful in identifying Catalan (or Basque) nationalism both with the democratic cause and, to a large extent, with radical political positions. Thus, for Catalans and Basques, the Francoist invasion was doubly oppressive.

As elsewhere in Spain, the country was deprived of teachers, scientists, technicians, many if not most of whom had sided with the legally established republican political order. Experienced political leaders left or were executed. The entire trade union leadership was killed, exiled or imprisoned. Writers were silenced. Moreover, the war, like all civil conflagrations, produced an acute political polarisation that tended to blur important distinctions and obliterate otherwise crucial loyalties and attachments. Thus, if a very substantial section of the Catalan industrial oligarchy did embrace the cause of Francoism whole-heartedly, large factions of the conservative land-owning *pagesia*, Catholic upper middle classes, and others 'went over' to the Francoists rather in the expectation of a right-wing, law-and-order Republic than of what was to come. Most of the members of these latter conservative groups, - civil engineers, business managers - suffered a shock when they realised the extent of the anti-Catalan nature of the post-1939 regime. It was second only to the one they had when a sudden revolutionary wave seemed to sweep everything in its path in July of 1936. Many in the former group, the upper Catalan bourgeoisie, escaped to France, and hence went to the rebel zone. When they came back to Catalonia, they often obtained enormous benefits: they were given sinecures, governorships, important trade licences. Many of them were very active members of the *Lliga*, from whose ranks a great part of the Catalan Francoist establishment arose. Much local government and industrial corruption, in many years to come, had ex-*Lliga* men at its centre. On the whole, however, their share of the political spoils of war (apart from reaping the fruits of a law-and-order regime as factory owners or financiers) was markedly smaller than that allotted to other regional groups in the Francoist establishment.

Under all these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Catalonia should become a trouble-spot for the regime throughout its existence. It was very frequently its chief cause for worry, at least until the Basque separatist movement began to pose a very serious threat to its stability, in December 1973, when Prime Minister Carreró Blanco was killed by ETA commandos. The main forms of Catalan opposition to the regime were fundamentally of four kinds: popular indifference and spontaneous civil disobedience; cultural Catalanism; democratic and economic struggles; and, finally, the development of an alternative political legitimacy. Very frequently the four overlapped and appeared to be intertwined, but were ultimately distinct from each other.

(a) Indifference and withdrawal, as the least dangerous of responses, enjoyed immediate favour with the populace. Thus if a policeman asked people to switch to the official language while on a train or in public places they would fall silent and wait for him to leave. After some time, the vernacular became tolerated and the signs on walls and telephone booths asking everyone to employ the Language of the Empire (*sic*) began to yellow and were never replaced. Civil disobedience came later, when quite subtle though sometimes vastly spectacular ways to show popular discontent were used: thus in the massive 1951 general strike, which was largely spontaneous, people refused to use public transport and virtually all shopkeepers put up their shutters. Years later, anti-Catalan remarks uttered by the editor of the newspaper with the widest circulation in Spain, Barcelona's *La Vanguardia*, met with a massive boycott of the paper, while the streets of the capital were littered with its pages. Only in the Basque country was this kind of widespread, popular, peaceful action sufficient to attract the frequent attention of the international press.

Indifference and muted hostility to the state authorities, on the other hand, has a long tradition in the Southern European world, and regimes such as Franco's only increased it, for they also fostered a cynical view of public servants and their probity. The demise of that regime did not mean that the people at large abandoned their old misgivings altogether, though as in Italy, certain Spanish parties, for instance, the communists, are widely seen, even by their enemies, as more honest in strictly administrative matters than others. In spite of high levels of abstention in the 1979 Spanish Cortes elections and in those to the Catalan Parliament in the following year, popular or at least party participation at local and parliamentary government levels is now much greater, and there is no extraparliamentary force of

the proportions of the pre-Civil War anarchist movement to actively campaign against the state. (In the post-Franco years the anti-state campaign has been carried out notably by the very small independent left wing movement, itself quite torn between participation in the state and local elections, where it has done disastrously, and outright opposition to the Spanish state.) With such a hazardous history in the field of the relations between the state and its subjects, it seems obvious that the way ahead towards the creation of mutual confidence between citizens and the public bodies will not be easy. Yet, some bases for the patient recovery of lost public confidence and real citizen participation have now been established with the new Statute of Autonomy, granted in 1979. At least in Catalonia - and no doubt in other minority nations elsewhere - such a gap cannot be bridged without at least a minimum of home rule.

(b) In a country whose culture was denied any status beyond that of a folkloristic curiosity, its continuation and normal practice became crucial. In this, it must be emphasised once more, there was a considerable cultural substratum - strongest amongst the large urban middle classes, including, in particular, the lower middle class - whose conceptions about the exact political nature of the language, culture and certain 'collective signs of identity' as they have been called, was very acute. This substratum was, in fact, part of what had become, through a complex cultural process with its roots in the origins of the nineteenth century literary *Renaixença* movement, the hegemonic culture of the Catalans, that is, a culture capable of legitimising certain common courses of action and de-legitimising others, in this case, the superimposed, alien Francoist ideology.

Very slowly and with great difficulties, the clandestine private teaching of Catalan began. A few books (at first, 'harmless' traditional poetry, then some 'safe' novels) were published under strict censorship conditions after 1943, journals by exiles were smuggled in, some unorthodox university courses were held in private homes. Cryptic political poetry managed to escape the censor's obtuse notice at the end of 1949, when Salvador Espriu published his magnificent allegorical play *Esther's First Story*. Meanwhile underground cultural magazines had appeared. When one died, another took its place: *Ariel* (from 1946 to 1951) being one of the most important. The Catalanist Catholic establishment, represented by the national monastery of Montserrat - which now acquired the character of holy place for unbelievers as much as for believers - published, under 'ecclesiastical' censorship, *Germinàbit* in 1949, to be followed in 1960 by a monthly

of considerable influence, *Serra d'Or*. These highly intellectual publications, however, did not reach everywhere, and what they could say was very limited: no political comment, no current affairs. Like the theatrical ventures, students' leaflets and other clandestine publications, their effect was magnified only by virtue of the government's unremittingly hostile attitude.

In order to make up for these shortcomings a series of notable attempts to normalise the culture by legal means were made by people in the liberal professions, intellectuals, academics and some businessmen. New publishing houses were launched. One of them, Edicions 62, stands out for its efforts to reach every kind of public and to introduce, in Catalan, every current of modern thought and literature. In running battles with the censorship, works on existentialism, marxism, psychoanalysis, sociology, political economy, physics came out of its presses, as well as popular novels, accessible to a wide public. It was from this publishing firm that an ambitious *Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana* in the manner of the international encyclopedias, was successfully launched and, after more than a decade, was completed with many volumes to its credit from the efforts of countless Catalan specialists in every field of learning. A foundation for the wide support of diverse cultural tasks, Omnium Cultural was started in 1961. It was financed by popular subscription and obtained the support of a great number of 'apolitical' middle class citizens even through the years when it, too, was outlawed by the authorities. Omnium Cultural sponsored Catalan language courses, book fairs, and every possible cultural effort. Its record was very soon impressive, and it was made possible by the financial formula that allowed it - in contrast with the risky publishing business and other precarious private ventures - to run permanently at a deficit. Finally, in the mid-70's a general Congress of Catalan Culture was prepared with the help of many private groups and individuals. It covered all fields of scientific, cultural and artistic endeavour. When it finally took place, in 1977, the transition to democracy was well under way. If the Congress did thereby lose some of its original 'antifascist' attractions it became nevertheless an important affirmation of identity and collective achievement at a critical moment in Spanish history.

Crucial though all these efforts were in keeping alive the flame of cultural identity and creativity, the medium whose political repercussions went well beyond anyone's expectations (whether democrats or supporters of the regime) was that of popular song and music. The ideological impact

of the *Nova Cançó* ('New Folk Song') movement of the 60's is well-known but there is still need for a serious study of this notable event in the history of modern political culture. It encompassed a number of different strands: the generational confrontations of the age, the international cultural climate - it was part and parcel of the 'protest' and pacifist western popular culture of those years - anti-fascism, nationalist revivalism, pan-Catalanism. Although the *Nova Cançó* was started self-consciously by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singers, who took their name, the *Setze Jutges*, from a traditional tongue-twister, it soon became an entirely popular phenomenon, especially when a singer called Raimon, from Xàtiva, south of Valencia, managed to take the new folk-songs to much wider audiences. 'Protest songs', classical and modern poems set to music, often with cryptic words whose meaning was nonetheless plain to everyone, suddenly enjoyed a phenomenal success. The more Catalan singers were banned from the radio and television networks, and their concerts prohibited by local governors, the more popular they became. Moreover, records and cassette recordings were far more difficult to stop. The high quality of much of the music and the texts (especially when composed by singers as refined and original as, for instance, Lluís Llach), in combination with their quasi-religious following, did for Catalan culture more than any other collective effort had so far done for it under Francoism. It made the language and its people known, liked and, to some extent, better understood all over Spain. It helped to give people - especially young people - all over the *Països Catalans*, or Catalan-speaking territories, a sense of community till then never felt nor expressed so intensely. A Basque musical revival, not unrelated to the Catalan precedent, ensued, and was followed by lesser ones in Aragón and even Castile. At a time when both harmless traditional songs and the ancient national anthem of the Catalans, *Els Segadors*, the Reapers, were banned, the new popular music, explosively combining the longings of the times and the place, the 'protest' spirit of the 60's and the ever electrifying passions of nationalism, was bound to have certain notable effects. A whole new generation mocked and ridiculed the ageing regime with songs and music, and with their help slowly rebuilt for itself the timeless myths and communal icons of the country.

(c) Economic and political struggles against Francoism began in the early stages under the spell of the antagonisms and loyalties that had developed in the war. The weakness of political organisations was so great, however, and the advantages of acting under 'non-political' labels or connections

so considerable that there was a marked tendency - which lasted right to the very end of the regime - for opposition to take a spontaneous, civic, non-party form. Parties, unions and other illegal political bodies became much more influential as the years passed, but what must be emphasised - for we are talking about the fabric of Catalan society - is the notable vitality of collective, non-partisan, democratic activity. The traditional strengths and virtues of civil society, rooted in the age-old collective habit of falling back upon the 'unofficial' world, once more stood the Catalans in good stead. Of course, the non-partisan nature of much of the civic democratic revival of the period was very often class-bound or related to local interests and group ideological positions. To ignore this would be nearly as silly as to see the entire process in terms of class conflict and confrontation, and to turn a blind eye to the remarkable degree of agreement that slowly developed among parties, classes, 'ethnic' communities and occupational groups about the kind of pluralist, democratic society most people wanted.

The civic culture of the society generated, from the start, a significant amount of popular (middle class) sympathy and even support for workers' strikes and demonstrations at crucial moments. Activity was greater, of course, on the cultural front, and always seen as less dangerous. It was considerable too, in the people's continued desire to reconstruct the texture of their civil society by re-building their institutions, which included the *menestral* and middle-class athaeneums, folkdance associations (*esbarts*), choirs and mountaineering and sports clubs. No one was unaware of their 'Catalanist' implications. Though the saying that the Barcelona Football Club 'is more than a club' has been restricted only to it, it seems more correct to use the expression for far less commercialised sports associations such as the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya* or the *Unió Esportiva de Sants* (the latter, a typical product of the Barcelonese *menestralia*, is the traditional sponsor of the Catalonia cycling race). Though severely purged, most of these innocuous institutions and clubs managed to survive the debacle and it was largely from them and through them that the wounds inflicted on the popular collective self-esteem were healed.

The Catalan Church, painfully divided during the war between loyalty to the land and hatred of the 'godless reds' who had nevertheless taken up its defence, became an important platform in the recovery. As early as 1944, the national shrine of Montserrat in the care of the Benedictine order of monks, saw the formation of the illegal 'Catalan University Front',

the origin of what would later become one of the most powerful democratic student movements in Spain. (The 'First Free Student Assembly' of Spain was celebrated at the University of Barcelona, under police siege, in 1957, and marked the beginning of the relentless 'war' between Francoism and University students.) Moreover, in 1962 Abbot Escarré, of the same monastery, was the first bishop to condemn publicly the regime in the international press, whereupon he was exiled to Rome. By that time the Church as a whole had already begun to suffer a crisis of conscience and to have qualms about its past record. As a result, soon priests would give shelter to clandestine workers' meetings in their own parishes; Franciscan friars, at Sarrià, would denounce oppression and torture from the pulpit to their well-to-do parishioners, and Jesuits, not to be outdone, would write, argue and criticise. 'Christian-Marxist' dialogues and seminars were held. All these activities found their counterparts elsewhere in Spain, but some were very specifically Catalan, such as the Catholic boy-scout movement, which had to brave attacks from fascist thugs while its followers were camping out or endure official harassment, while its mere existence posed a threat to the official fascist youth 'movement', controlled by the Falange. The importance of the scout movement for the development of the cadres of moderate Catalan parties of the post-Franco era cannot be underestimated.

The civic movement, seen in all its complexity as something separate from the parties, was essential for the condemnation which the regime had to endure in Catalonia. Now this condemnation was consistently orderly and peaceful in spite of the invariable brutality with which it was met. One result of the people's unwillingness to support violence is the fact that Catalonia today does not have a substantial terrorist movement bound to the tenets of separatism. All attempts at armed separatist struggle have dismally failed. Another was that the *via catalana vers la democràcia*, the Catalan path towards democracy, was able to summon support from very different social quarters by constantly playing on the established legality. This, it seems, was as important in the end as the massive illegal demonstrations that were launched in the last years of the regime in favour of political amnesty, freedom and home rule. One example of this were the professional bodies comprising the respected Catalan Bar Association, the College of Architects, the *Casal del Metge* or Medical Association and the Civil Engineers' Association. In the end they all became extremely defiant and gave themselves democratic constitutions, creating thereby

a glaring anomaly within the general political order of the state. Yet the best illustration was the vast 'neighbourhood association' movement of the 70's, an exercise in grass-roots democracy paradoxically much superior in some ways to much the country saw after the restoration of parliamentarianism. The movement was based on perfectly legal, 'apolitical' local residents' associations whose chief concerns were conditions in housing, schools, parks, and so on. Though parallel organisations appeared elsewhere in Spain, the Catalan phenomenon soon reached great proportions, and was successfully used to challenge undemocratic, unrepresentative authorities, to denounce violations of civil rights and to establish a measure of popular self-management in urban areas which had suffered the most appalling neglect for a very long time.

(d) After 1939, undeterred by their terrible defeat, and doubtlessly inspired by their mistaken confidence in the help that they hoped to receive from the Allies, political forces continued the open struggle against the dictatorship. It was thus that the already weakened anarchists lost their last active nuclei in Catalonia. (The CNT was only reorganised in 1977, and on a vastly diminished basis.) Communists and socialists, having also suffered additional early defeats, later concentrated on rebuilding their parties and the workers' movement. The former were later very successful in controlling the Workers Commissions (*comissions obreres*) that steadily formed all over Spain in the 60's. These commissions were originally a non-party trade union conglomerate. Although all left-wing party militants were exposed to persecution, imprisonment and torture, the Communists - as is nearly always the case with reactionary regimes - were the main target and suffered more than anyone for it once the initial stages of the repression - which was equally cruel to all - were over. At any rate, both movements managed to develop a considerable base in the range of opposition, although the Communists, in organisational terms, were more numerous and efficient. The Communists consolidated their party, the PSUC, through a firm federation with the Spanish Communist Party, the PCE. The Socialists created their own MSC, the Socialist Catalan Movement, in 1945, and remained independent of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and its main Trade Unions Council (UGT) until quite late, in 1977, when they likewise established federal links with it. The reduction of the once all-powerful Anarchist union, the CNT, to a minority organisation and the corresponding rise of the Communist Workers Commissions (CCOO) and the Socialist UGT as the two chief labour unions

brought their numerous membership into the 'legitimate' political sphere together with their aspirations which were no different from those of other western workers and employees: job security, salary improvements better working conditions. (The ideals of workers' management and self-management in general - *autogestió* - so central to the Socialist Party of Catalonia during the late 70's soon receded into the background.) By the same token, the great political void on the left in Catalonia (and in other areas, such as Andalusia) that once created some of the insurmountable imbalances which eventually tore Spain apart was filled by a highly moderate Eurocommunist PSUC and a social-democratic, semi-autonomous branch of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. The fact that they have, respectively, 'Stalinist' and socialist radicals in their midst, or that they possess 'Catalanist' or 'Centralist' factions has so far made little difference to their main, cautiously reformist strategies. In their struggles for the decisive immigrant vote both left-wing parties have sought the support of their Spanish counterparts, though they are far from being at the mercy of their leadership either. Until the 1982 general election the Catalan Communist members of parliament, for example, made up half of the entire parliamentary PCE. With its score of MPs, however, it hardly posed a threat to the PSOE which, unaided, formed the opposition to the conservative government of Adolfo Suárez. Catalan Christian conservative groups formed and reformed several times, and the origins of the present moderate, liberal Convergence Party, headed by the President of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, can be found among them, around 1954. Well before these parties managed to exert a systematic influence on events, and for a long time, the political initiative of the opposition was in the hands of an alliance of ad-hoc committees and movements.

It is impossible to give even the briefest account of general strikes, local strikes, workers' demonstrations, intellectuals' committees, the student movement, ecclesiastical protest, and so many other events and activities in favour of democracy. Suffice it to say that in the end a democratic, widely supported, legitimate authority was established. It became embodied in a series of entirely proscribed political institutions which commanded the ordinary citizen's respect. The most important since 1971 was the Catalan Assembly or *Assemblea de Catalunya* which included parties, unions, individual members and citizens' associations. It crowned, as it were, the entire Catalan body politic, for it also recognised the exiled Generalitat and its President Josep Tarradellas. The political parties within it, forming

the Assembly of Political Forces, would later, having previously agreed their own strategy with President Tarradellas, open their own negotiations with the central government in the transition period that led to the re-establishment of home-rule for the country. Though more restricted than that enjoyed by Catalonia in 1932 (as the minority independentist movement is always quick to point out), the 1979 Statute of Autonomy nevertheless offers possibilities for development and democracy for the Catalans which are vastly greater than those they had from 1939 to 1977.

It would be wrong to finish this schematic reference to the path followed by the Catalans in their recovery of democracy without a reference to those amongst them who did support dictatorial rule, lest the impression is given that they were all, to a man, on the side of the angels. Apart from the already mentioned upper-bourgeoisie and oligarchy which sided with the Francoist forces from the beginning, the small but very combative remnant of the old-fashioned Carlist movement was fiercely anti-Republican, and therefore fought with the Francoists. (Upon being marginalised by the regime they helped come to power, they later joined the opposition and eventually even the Catalan Assembly, but were finally thoroughly routed at the polls.) Catalan Fascists or Falangists, also appeared, though not in considerable numbers. They reaped sinecures, official posts and the spoils of war, after many of them having been quite active in the Francoist fifth column. More interesting, at least sociologically, were the Catalan members of the semi-secret Catholic lay order, the Opus Dei. Its insistence on piety, but especially on hard-work, 'getting on in life', productivity, 'modernity' and prudence, for a time attracted a number of middle-class university students in Catalonia far more than did the militantly 'Castilian' and grandiloquent Falange. Though Catalan representation at governmental level was either non-existent or very low, the arrival to power of the Opus Dei, after 1959, meant the appointment of some Catalan ministers belonging to that lay order, together with other high officials in lesser posts in their 'technocratic' roles as economic experts. In terms of social class structure, however, all this was less far reaching than the nearly complete absorption of the established oligarchy of Catalonia into the upper-class strata of Spain. (Yet a substantial part of the prosperous 'national bourgeoisie' of Catalonia remained tied to the local network of interests throughout the period, as their political behaviour before and after 1977 clearly shows; perhaps that was what prompted *Le Figaro's* normally prudent editorial writers in Paris to explain the 1980 Catalan

election results by stating that 'the Catalan bourgeoisie never betrayed its native land' and therefore kept the confidence of the people.) If, therefore, on the threshold of the 80's Spain as a whole continued to encompass a number of diverse social structures, rather than one single state-wide class system, this was not true for the highest social class in the scale of power, wealth and privilege, for its final unity - and the overcoming of traditional contradictory interests and outlooks between its different regional sectors - was forged in the 40 years of the Francoist dictatorship. At any rate the recent rise of a 'state bourgeoisie', of a new set of party-bound political classes (mostly made up of middle-class professionals) and of certain 'technocratic' elites has considerably altered the composition of the ruling strata everywhere in Spain. Their greater complexity, recruitment and mobility patterns, occupational structure and new value orientations are an expression of the profound social transformations that have recently taken shape everywhere on Iberian soil.

VI

THE FUTURE OF THE CATALANS

Nowhere is the extent of such transformations more evident than in Catalonia itself. The most cursory glance at its society shows the existence of vast contrasts between it and the world which has now been left behind for good. Thus, as I indicated previously, Catalonia has now become fully integrated into the general Spanish economy and, indeed, into the advanced industrial late-capitalist economy of the West. The implications of this two-level integration for the future of its economic autonomy are very serious indeed, for this is now more diminished than ever. Yet, the very nature of advanced capitalist corporatism everywhere may require the counterbalances of economic 'regional' units both for purposes of democratic control and for greater economic rationality. By the same token, Catalonia has seen the rise within it of entire new social classes, first and foremost of a non-Catalan immigrant proletariat, which later began to transform itself into a modern native (not always necessarily 'Catalanised') working class, with a large section of it in the skilled manual labour category. This, together with other trends, has entailed a number of shifts in the

ratios between the social classes as well as occupational modifications in their internal composition. I have pointed out above some of the political rearrangements that all this has brought about, the most important of them being the entire restructuring of the Left on a new ideological basis.

I am not sure what the ultimate consequences of these changes will be for the future of Catalonia. For instance, important changes in the cultural sphere have occurred, closely bound to these social transformations, whose ultimate direction is hard to ascertain. A 'cultural revolution' in the country since 1960 has taken place which, given the nature of traditional culture in the preceding decades, can only be described in terms of crisis. From about that date a profound change in attitudes, values, beliefs and ideologies began to spread among the younger generations. These changes were, to a very great extent, the continuation of cultural trends which began to come to a head much earlier under republican auspices, entailing further secularisation, greater sexual permissiveness, ideological commitment to 'new' socialist ideologies, including 'Christian Marxist' ones, and so forth. They obviously represented a convergence towards the prevalent European cultural patterns. At the beginning, everything (crises in Catholic seminaries, decline in priestly vocations, successful appearance of new religious sects, an intense interest in Marxism, new attitudes towards the family and the equality of women) seemed to point in that direction. Thus by the late 70's the women's liberation and the ecologist movements in Catalonia - probably the strongest in the Iberian Peninsula - were second to none. It was clear that the specific conditions of the long, reactionary dictatorship, and the ever powerful libertarian tendencies of the 'counterculture' of Spain - often more rooted in a blind revolt against authoritarianism than in anything else - were producing the strongest reactions. There was an aggressive and crusading spirit in the vast 'counterculture' which sprang up all over Spain. It stemmed not only from a revolt against the recent obscurantist oppression of the finally dead dictatorship but also from the continued presence of a police force that was, to say the least, very poorly integrated with the citizenry, as well as the tensions and malaise of political terrorism, the insecurity bred by high unemployment and inflation, the occasional backlash of fascist bands, the persistent fears of the military coup, and the steep rise in violent crime in a country unused to it. All this was compounded by the apparent inability of the large left-wing parties to fire the imagination of many of the erstwhile supporters of the democratic movement, whose

disenchantment and disappointment were now as profound as their nearly Utopian hopes once were. The ideological and political indifference of many was a reaction - roughly between 1978 and 1982 - to the preceding political effervescence of the transition years with its massive popular participation. It led many to forms of individualistic hedonism and to lack of economic drive which are well known in other societies. Yet, once more, it would be simplistic to speak of a mere convergence towards them, though certain parallels - with contemporary Italy, for instance - seem inevitable. Though many of the numerous people involved in this manifold 'cultural revolution' seem to be sure of what they want, many too are in a characteristic state of moral and intellectual confusion which impinges upon others - children in schools, for instance - and can hardly be described as a good thing.

Have the major changes described earlier, as well as these most recent cultural trends, transformed Catalan society beyond recognition? Has it, this time, reached a point where its once vigorous distinctive traits, making up the *fet diferencial*, are rapidly becoming residues and relics? These are not easy questions to answer. Looking back upon the course of Catalan history it appears that the country has consistently shown a remarkable capacity to take social change and all sorts of innovation in its stride. Change and continuity both seem to be essential elements in its make-up, for Catalonia is a conservative and traditionalistic society which is also, nonetheless, geared towards certain forms of innovation. In this, of course, as in so many other things, it is not unique, for there are no doubt other equally adaptable and dynamic societies in the world. Just like some of them, Catalan society was organised from the start around certain cultural and structural principles that allowed for considerable amounts of change without a complete loss of identity. For reasons that hopefully became apparent in my initial discussion of the patterns of free association, compromise and accommodation that characterise its life, Catalonia avoided certain political rigidities and ideological blind alleys that would have spelled its doom as a viable social order, or even pushed some of its people into the despair and terrorism which, in the modern world, have gripped certain small stateless nations. The economic mentality of many Catalans, moreover, has added to their survival skills in a world for which they were particularly well fitted from the start. To a noticeable extent, mercantile and industrial success has managed to offset a great number of political shortcomings, starting with those peculiar to the Catalans themselves, so well illustrated by the misconceptions and miscalculations of Catalanist leaders in the past.

All these assertions about Catalan adaptability to innovation and social change, however, must not be taken too literally. In the same manner that, as we saw, the inclination towards negotiation and compromise, the characteristic 'pactism' of the Catalans broke down when pressure was sufficiently great, and class, political and economic antagonisms too acute, limits to permanence and continuity also exist in the face of too much change. To be precise, the institutions and inventions of the modern world are likely to strike at certain nerve centres of small national communities existing within large state units in a manner for which they are not prepared. Under the conditions of early industrialism, local and ethnic communities were often able to contain the cultural encroachments of alien forces with relative success. The situation, under conditions of greater modernity, seems to have changed drastically. Thus Catalans now face constant exposure to the French and Spanish 'national' media (especially television) in their respective official languages, and systematic and acute centralist pressure throughout their children's school curriculum, while other forces in the political and economic spheres continue to undermine their culture and to erode inherited social identities. The phenomenon, of course, bears no resemblance to the willed 'cultural genocide' of yesteryear and its roots are to be found in the impersonal logic of modern corporate capitalism and its political order. (It is, incidentally, largely as a reaction against these trends that many modern nationalist movements draw their unconscious strengths.) Barriers to full recovery and normalisation are everywhere serious (perhaps even in the only fully self-governing Catalan community, the small Principality of Andorra), not only because the Home Rule Statute leaves much to be desired in this respect, but also because the 1978 Spanish Constitution explicitly rules out the possibility of a Pan-Catalan Federation of Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the Principality of Catalonia. Nonetheless, it ought to be clear to everyone that a Constitution, in a liberal pluralist monarchy such as Spain, can be amended. Therefore, cries of dictatorial 'Spanish' oppression under the new circumstances are out of place: if a sufficient number of people in the Catalan Countries want more self-rule, inter-Catalan co-operation, a greater linguistic renaissance, they may still get them in the end, long and arduous though the way ahead may be.

In the modern world intellectuals matter. They do so above all in those societies where the formulation of a collective purpose is crucial for the people's sense of identity in terms of national consciousness. Within them,

they are vital for the shaping of the political forces at work. All this is especially true of Catalonia, where the far-reaching changes undergone in recent times have not diminished the intellectuals' traditionally influential role. On the contrary, those transformations have made new demands upon the Catalan community. The onset of democracy and the achievement of a fair measure of national autonomy after 1977 have only highlighted the difficulties inherent in the new situation: the ambiguities between the 'Spanish' and the 'Catalan' identities as well as the redefinition of Catalonia's place and responsibility in the emerging political order of the constitutional monarchy. More so perhaps than ever before Catalan writers, broadcasters, poets, academics, journalists, as well as scientists, historians and artists are now called upon to comment on the state of the nation, to specify collective goals and diagnose the tribal ills. The debate has shifted from yesterday's heroics, grounded on a common cause against dictatorship and cultural genocide, to a far more intricate situation. Catalonia is now thrown into a much more competitive and less obviously prominent position within the wider culture of Spain. Thus, during the long decades of the dictatorship Barcelona and Catalonia generally appeared as a haven of modernity and creativity: there was a universe which did not seem to care at all about the regime's dogmas and pieties, calmly going its own way. Many Spanish intellectuals, students and members of the educated middle classes 'envied' the atmosphere of Catalonia and the skill of its people to carry on their own cultural life with insolent indifference to the official world of Francoism. The advent of democracy, however, changed all this. Spain began to live again. It is far too early to assess the quality of what is being produced in the arts and sciences, but it is obvious that, in comparison with the recent past, the situation has improved spectacularly. The rise of Madrid as a lively and cosmopolitan European capital is a significant development. This fact alone has transformed substantially the terms of the traditional rivalry between the two great Spanish cities. In the early 80's a debate developed about this issue which oscillated between the repetitious and the innovative. Thus, whilst some commentators hastily and superficially declared Barcelona to have suddenly become 'provincial', 'parochial' and irretrievably lost in sterile and boring old local obsessions, others engaged in a more fruitful exchange of views concerning the diverse national Spanish cultures and their place in the future. One can only rejoice that new centres of creativity have come into their own in several parts of Spain. Despite the ever-present dangers of parochialism attendant upon any nationalism, Basque, Andalusian and

Galician autonomism has already yielded palpable results for their respective cultures and therefore for Spain as a whole.

It would be far too simplistic to classify Catalan intellectuals according to some easy dichotomy, say, between 'localists' and 'cosmopolitans', 'independentists' and 'centralists', 'nostàlgics' and 'progressives'. These contrasts will not do, since the truth is that the intelligentsia in Catalonia is at once divided and united. Its divisions are often fierce because the urgency of problems created by rapid socio-political change combine with irritation at apparent procrastination in matters of devolution and decentralisation. Furthermore, the linguistic and political rights of the massive immigrant population complicate and even embitter public and private discourse. A further twist is provided by the pan-Catalan dimension of the Principality's culture: this is a fact rather than a matter of interpretation, for Catalan culture represents a common bond between people in the Roussillon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands.

More so than elsewhere, intellectuals in Catalonia tend to be seen as potential agents of legitimation by most parties and political movements. This does not help in the task of clarification. The tension between the introspective nationalists and those who emphasise the manifestly universalist, European traditions of Catalan culture and civil society will not easily be resolved. Both sides have vital interests to defend and social forces to back them up. Theirs is not merely a quarrel among local pundits, be they intellectuals, men of letters or media-men. It is also a struggle cast in political terms and amply used by politicians. Thus parties of Catalan 'national obedience' (conservative in one way or another, and therefore often in direct and contradictory alliance with centralist conservatives elsewhere in Spain) confront parties in federation with Spanish political organisations. The latter therefore are neither necessarily able nor willing to exhibit an over zealous Catalanist militancy. Those who point out these contradictions and spell out the dangers implied in each of the chief standard positions, however, incite everyone's displeasure.

I know of only one kind of intellectual animal who has dared to spell out the fear that the future may also bring the end of the story. Yet it would be foolhardy to dismiss the reasoned arguments of a learned bunch - poets and literati all - about the gradual impoverishment of the Catalan tongue and the undermining of the fabric of Catalan society as purely alarmist, or only confine them to one level among the several that make

up the complex uniqueness of the country. The *Angst* about the ultimate consequences of the transformations being undergone by their society is certainly not confined to a small minority of Catalans. For many, victories against the ageing Francoist dictatorship and the euphoria of a newly found freedom dispelled for a while the fears of an impending and irreversible 'decatalanisation'. National reconstruction under the more stable conditions of democracy and constitutionalism had its attendant difficulties. Not all of them stemmed from the proverbial tension between Barcelona and Madrid. Procrastinations, political chicanery, differing party interests, and disagreements within the Catalan camp itself have all made the way ahead a long and arduous one. But it is not barred.

The problems that face the Catalans today, as an identifiable national community within Spain, are manifold. The years of democratic transition and subsequent consolidation - from early liberalisation in 1976 until the Socialist victory at the polls, in October 1982 - were also years of recession and hardship. The economic depression hit Catalonia especially hard, for the country was burdened with traditional industries such as textiles and consumer-oriented manufactures like electric home appliances. But efforts to revitalise the small and medium enterprises that characterise much of Catalan industry have already yielded some results. The non-industrial sector of the economy has been quietly 'rediscovered'. Tourism, for instance, has now been seen as the significant source it is for the Catalan economy: 40 percent of all hotel units and 60 percent of all camp-sites in Spain were in Catalonia in the late 70's. Family-owned enterprises in agriculture have found a new spirit of expansion. For instance, despite some foreign and non-Catalan penetration into the sparkling-wine area of the Penedès, the old families continue to control their thriving business: by 1982 the champagne production of the small region reached 86 million bottles, while exports all over the world soared. Although an alarming lack of local investment still continued to bedevil the economy in what seemed to be the trough of a grave recession in 1983, some developments in the microelectronics industry, supported by scientific and technological education, were encouraging signs that the needs of industrial reconversion - boldly preached for the whole of Spain by the moderate Socialist government - were acutely felt in Catalonia by people of many persuasions. At any rate the enterprising acumen of the natives has not flagged. It continues to flourish in well-established and prestigious institutions such as the Barcelona International Trade Fair and in the transformation of the

Catalan capital into one of the chief regular venues of international conventions, conferences and symposia of all kinds. The shifts in economic emphasis and the greater integration of the Catalan economy into the Spanish one are reflected both in the industrialists' and the workers' organisations. The traditional Catalan employers' organisation, the *Foment del Treball*, was reconstituted in 1976. In the following year, it took the initiative in the creation of an all-Spanish confederation of employers' organisations, the CEOE, whose first President, a Catalan, later lent his support to the centralist right-wing opposition to the government, rather than orienting the *Foment* towards its original stance in favour of the conservative, albeit Catalanist, ruling party in the Generalitat. Similarly, the Catalan trade-unions are, despite their federal structure, wholly integrated into the all-Spanish ones. There is no Catalan trade-unionism in the same sense that there are some significant, exclusively Basque trade unions.

At the political level, interpretation of how best should parties represent the Catalan *and* the non-Catalan constituency echoes in part the issues of the social organisation of the economy. The Catalan Socialist party, by allying itself with the main Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, managed to win important victories at the local and the Catalan-national level: the 'immigrant' working classes who otherwise would not have voted for an exclusively Catalan or Catalanist party did vote for a Catalan branch of the all-Spanish one. As a consequence, and for the first time in many decades, there are a number of Catalan ministers and junior ministers in the new Socialist Government in Madrid. One of them, Sr Narcís Serra, a former mayor of Barcelona, was appointed to the all-important post of Minister of Defence. For its part, the ruling Convergence party of President Pujol, through its chief representative in the Madrid parliament, Sr Miquel Roca, by 1983 showed a restless desire to form some sort of centre coalition for the whole of Spain, so as to escape the confinement to which 'regional' parties must be condemned when the powers of their 'region' are circumscribed. This is felt more acutely by all concerned inside and outside Catalonia for it is clear that its personality - as that of the Basque country - is far more pronounced than those areas which make up the German *Länder* or the Italian regions. For the good and the peace of Spain, Catalonia must be given its due.

Political forces in Catalonia, therefore, must face the apparent dilemma of either struggling for greater participation in the Spanish polity (at the

risk of dilution into it and weakening of support of the more Catalanist part of the citizenry) or concentrating exclusively on the specific concern and interests of their Catalan world, which entails the peril of provincialism and isolation. In fact, good statecraft in Catalonia largely consists of the skilful balance of these two dimensions. There is no reason why they should be mutually antagonistic. On the contrary, as President Tarradellas showed when he came back from exile in 1977 to take effective control of the re-established Generalitat, constitutionalism and democracy in Spain can greatly benefit from a strong and flourishing Catalonia: its children know that only in such a framework is there hope for their country. This may be one reason why the civic culture of Catalonia leaves little room for extremism. The pitifully poor showing in several elections of the really separatist element represented by *Nacionalistes d'Esquerra* or Left-wing Nationalists (there is now hardly any right-wing separatism left in Catalonia), seems to emphasise this fact. Catalan political and economic forces (understandably less so cultural ones) are on the whole trying always to integrate and co-ordinate their own interests with those of the wider framework of Spain. Cultural forces, for their part, in their natural zeal for the preservation of language and collective personality, often tend to understand 'integration' in terms of assimilation *into* their national culture. By and large, however, they are respectful (even punctiliously so) of the constitutional rights of non-Catalans. If anything, the school system, the mass media, the press and many other institutions are still clearly biased in favour of a non-Catalan universe. Cultural and linguistic normalisation thus encounters great and complex difficulties, but on some key fronts it is managing some substantial progress, in education and lately in television, whose full effects will be felt in the future.


It is still too early to predict the final result of all these interesting processes unleashed by the advent of democracy in Spain. Despite the recession and the painful inheritance of Francoism, some years of democratic rule in Catalonia have begun to yield visible results in terms of public services, ecological protection, open local government, associational life, advances in schooling, urban planning, sustained public sponsorship of the arts, improvements in higher education and advanced scientific and scholarly research. With their characteristic scepticism Catalans are not really quite sure that all this is happening, and are always ready to point how *malament que es fan les coses*, how badly and clumsily things are being done by all concerned. But things are getting done now, and not always as badly

as contemporary observers are bound to judge them. And, given the circumstances of intense social change and the political and economic pressure to which Catalonia is subjected, many are aware of the crucial nature of the historical period upon which the country has entered. It is, as a Valencian intellectual has said, a question of *ara o mai*: now or never. The near future, then, will show whether the Catalans are able to confront their new problems and uncertainties with the ingenuity, civility and quiet determination which they have so often been seen to possess in the past. This is certainly what the situation requires of them once more.

Catalan speaking areas (names are given in the Catalan language)



The ethno-cultural areas of the Iberian Peninsula



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